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I.	 INTRODUCTION
In to nns of its effect on a planetary exploration mission,
planetary quarantine represents a conflict of goals. For, on the
one hand, it is desired to minimize the probability that the planet
will be contaminated in the coursz of exploration. However, in
pursuing this goal, it is necessary to impose constraints on engineer-
ing implementation of planetary missions which can detract from the
probability of mission success. The latter probability could, in
principle, be enhanced by appropriate expenditures of resources,
but the conservation of resources is also an important goal and,
frequently, an over-riding consideration. Hence, quarantine con-
straints, and alternatives for meeting them, must be examined in
sufficient detail to identify those courses of action which compro-
mise either quarantine or mission objectives.
The conflicting goal situation and the complexity of the
problem suggest the applicaticn of system analysis methods. Comp-
lexity derives, in part, from the interdisciplinary scope of the
problem in that it encompasses biological, engineering, statistical
and economic considerations. Within each of these disciplineq how-
ever there is further complexity: complexity of biological consider-
ations derives from the need to selectively apply those aspects of
microbiology which are pertinent to planetary quarantine and from the
need to do so in the context of spacecraft technology; the complexity
of engineering and economic considerations stems from the fact that
quarantine constraints pervade spacecraft design, assembly, test and
mission logistics; and,statistical complexity derives from the consider-
able uncertainty associated with many of the key factors which enter
into the problem. A solely intuitive approach is therefore not likely
to yield answers with sufficient confidence in their validity or their
adequacy.
When the technological content of a complex problem is signi-
ficant, as is the case with planetary quarantine, a major component of
systems analysis is mathematical modelling. The program conducted Under
the subject contract has had as one of its objectives the development
r
i
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Of a mathematical model applicable to the analysis of spacecraft
sterilization requirements. This model is defined in chapter II of
this report and is further elaborated in Appendix A. The computer
i	 program used in the course of this program to exercise the model
I	 for specific application studies is described in Appendix B.
It is to be noted that the model developed under this program
does not enco•npass all of the mathematical modelling which is per-
tinent to planetary quarantine. It is referred to as a sterili-
zation model because it focuses on the implementation of a require-
ment,imposed on spacecraft which are intended to lard on a planet,
which leads to sterilization of spacecraft equipment. Furthermore,
the detailed development of the model is based principally on heat
sterilization practice.
Separate models exist, and are in use, for the fcrmulation of
the requirements :chose implementation is considered 'herein (ref. 4,5).
Similarly, additional models are being developed, both at Exote,^h
and by others,to deal with particular parameters of the sterilization
model. Notable among these are models for bio-load prediction
(ref. L,7) and improved models of microbial survival (ref. 8,9).
The systems model for spacecraft stcrilizatior. has been developed
with a view toward two types of applications:
(a) to evaluate alternative approaches to the implementation
of sterilization requirements in the context of spacecraft
development practices
(b) to establish potential benefits and to formulate Frior.ities
in the conduct of R&D programs which aim at reducing the
uncertainties associated with model parameters.
The model developed under this program has been applied in
both the above categories to deal with questions of current interest.
Some of these studies were reported earlier in the program,whereas
the more recent application studies are described in Chapters III, IV
and V of this repor^.
2
In August of 1968 Exotech submitted an interim report under
the subject con ,- Tact titled "Effect of Microbial Release Probabilities
on Spacecraft Sterilization Requirements" (Fxotech document number
TR-SR - 034). In a broad sense, this interim report parallels the
scope of work described herein. Thus, it contains the formulation
and clevelopment of a systems model, describes the parameters involved,
and utilizes the model for an application study. It differs ; however,
in the following respects:
A. lie systems model described in the interim report represents
an earlier version which is extended, refined and more
adequately justified in the present report.
	 Furthermore,
the present model is formulated to be applicable to more
general problems so as to enhance its future usefulness.
B.	 The interim report represents an initial attempt at an
evaluation of the probability of microbial release in terms
of its implications on spacecraft sterilization require-
ments.	 It served the purpose of identifying areas of sup-
porting research and technology which could be potentially
( beneficial to the planetary quarantine program. 	 However,	 !
fthe formulation of microbial release probabilities in the
interim report is of more limited scope than that which
has evolved from subsequent work.
C.	 The interim report dealt with an applications study at a
time when microbial resistance values (the D values) were
i not yet firmly fixed.
	
One of the purposes of the ap-
t plication study reported therein has therefore been to eval-
uate the implications of a range of resistances for micro-
organisms on open surfaces, mated surfaces and buried contami-
nation on spacecraft sterilization requirements in general,
and priorities for R&D in particular.	 Since then, microbial
resistances have been firmed-up and the values used herein
of 
D125 =
 .5 hours for open surfaces, 
D125= 
1.0 hours for
mated surfaces and D125= 5 hours for buried contamination
were established by NASA Planetary Quarantine Office as a
basis for developing spacecraft sterilization requirements in
the immediate future.
The data contained in the interin, report is of curr,:nt interest
	 =-
principally to the extent that it deals with the effect of different
microbial resistance values on procedures for the implementation
of quarantine constraints. In Articular, it is of interest to note
that many of the results to be reported herein would be greatly
modified if microbial resistance values were to change from the currently
accepted ones. For a discussion of the detailed implications of such
changes in the D values, reference is made to the above interim report.
Chapter III of this report considers the different ways in
which heat sterilization can be distributed between a terminal cycle,
flight-acceptance testing and piece-part testing. This applications
study is pertinent to the implementation of heat-sterilization re-
quirements on a flight mission in that it deals with, among other
things, the minimization of terminal sterilization time in general,
and the avoidance of heat penetration into materials during the
to nuinal cycle in particular.
Chapter IV considers the effect of various parameter values on
heat sterilization requirements and,as such,offers guidelines for
the conduct of R&D programs as well as the needed emphasis on various
implementation practices in terns of their benefit in reduced heating
times.
The problem of arriving at a defensible estimate of microbial
release probabilities is treated in ChapterV, where a summary of
recent progress is provided.
The above applications studies are not unrelated. Thus, the
conclusions reached for a preferred approach to the distribution of
heating times (Chapter III) becomes the basis for limi.Ling and inter-
preting the sensitivity of sterilization times to model parameters
4	 i
f(Chapter IV ). Similarly, the estimation of microbial release prob-
abilities (Chapter V) is treated in the range of 'values which the
preceding sensitivity stucly has established.
	 These interrelations
are further highlighted in the summary and conclusions of Chapter VI.
This program was carried out by personnel of Exotech's
Systems Research Division under the technical direction of Samuel
Schalkowsky. Principal. participants were F.C. Kline, E. Bacon,
P. Randolph, L. Woodall and I. Jacoby.
Work reported herein is closely allied to the development
C of analytical techniques for planetary quarantine being carried out
by Exotech for the NASA Planetary Quarantine Office under contract
NASW-1734;the principal area of overlap is in development of models
for the estimation of microbial release probabilities, covered
herein in Chapter V.
The conduct of this program has greatly benefited from the
technical direcLion provided by Mr. Paul. Tarver of the NASA Office
of Planetary Piograms and also by Mr. Richard Kee, who was technical
monitor during earlier phases of this contract. The authors also
I	 wish to gratefully acknowledge the assistance provided by
Lawrence B. Hall and Dr. Donald Fox of NASA Headquarters, and
t '	Leo Daspit and Otis Childress of the Langley Research Center, in the
form of discussion and constructive criLi.cism of the applications
studies described herein. However, this should not be misconstrued
as an implication of their endorsement of ccnclusi.ons stated herein.
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II. PLANETARY QUAMINTINE IMPLEMENTATION MODEL
Planetary quarantinc -rcquirements for an 1ndiVidUal. mission
take the form:
P(N) 5-- R,	 (1)
where P(N) denotes the probability that the mission contaminates the
planet and where R denotes a prescribed maxim.im allowable value for
[Values -6P(N). 	 for R currently being considered vary between 10 	 and
10 -5 , depending upon the planet in question aril the anticipated number
of missions to the planet.I
To assure that the requirements specified in expression (1)
are met for any given mission, it is necessary to first prescribe an
t	 acceptable operational definition of P(N). This can be accomplishes]
i	
by means of the following definition:
A planet will have been contaminated if one or more
micro-organisms of terrestrial origin are deposited
by the Lander onto the planet's surface oz- into its
atmosphere and subsequently germinate and spread
during a specified (quarantine) period of time.
`
	
	
In order to apply the quarantine requirements of expression
(1) to a particular mission it is necessary to express P(N) in terms
of pertinent mission hardware, flight, biological and other environ-
mental parameters. Appropriatel y accomplished, this will provide a
mechanism or model for use in determining and evaluating alternatives
for meeting the requirements. It is important to note the desirability
of a model which is applicable to many aspects of implementing
quarantine requirements, e.g., (1) establishing R&D  priorities
related to planetary quarantine, (2) establishing general approaches
or guidelines to meeting requirements, (3) establishing the detailed
mechanics of meeting requirements for a particular mission and (4)
establishing adherence to quarantine requirements. The model
I
l_
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presented herein was developed with a view to these and other
applications.
Becal •se of a lack of sufficient information to develop Ind
I	
implement the model beyond a certain level of detail, nuraerous simpli-
fications are introduced. In all cases, however, the simplifications
are made "in the conservative direction", i.e., if properly applied,
the derived representation of P(N) will in all instances be greater
than P(N) itself. hence, if the derived representation is constrained
to be no greater.than R, then P(N) will certainly be no greater than R.
In adopting this position, however, it may turn out that application
of the resulting model yi.elclsresolts which are more severe than would
be necessary if additional information was available and included.
A. An Intermediate Representation of Ouarantine Requi=ements
-
	
	
On the basis of several reasonable assumptions it can be
shown (Appendix A) that
P (N) -'^ m ( r) p(g)	 (2)
where m(r) denotes the mean or average number of viable organisms
released onto the planet by the lander and where p(g) denotes the prob-
ability that a viable organism, randomly released by the lander onto
the planet, grows and spreads during the quarantine period. Combining
this expression with Expression (1) we see that quarantine requirements
will be satisfieu if
m ( r ) p ( g) 5 R.	 (3)
Without mirimizing the difficulty of determining or establishing
p(g), there is little that can be done about controlling its magnitude.
Therefore, once a value for p(g) has been established, the burden of
meeting mission constraints reduces to limiting the mean number of
viable organisms which the Lander releases onto the planet. Given
numerical values for R and p(g), quarantine goals will be met if
m(r) 5 R/p( g) •	 (4)
k_
7
r.
By way of illustration, if R is taken equal to 10 -5 and if p(g) is
determined to be 10 -3 , then the quarantine requirements for an individ-
ual lander be_ome
M(r) s 10-2,	 (5)
f	 i.e., "on the avera;e" no rore than one viable organise shall be
released onto the planet per 100 such missions.
t
E. Exvansicn of m(r)
Evolution of a useful m.,.)del of planetary quarantine imple-
mentation reduces to determining an expression for m(r) which involves
pertinent clission hard.,7are, processing, flight path a,Ld biological
parameters. To this end, the lander is conceptuall y: considered to be
a discrete collection of potential "sources of contamination", i.e.,
individual regions of the lander capable of transporting viable organisms
to a planet. Each source possesses a biological loading v hich is
likely to vary ir. magnitude w i th tire. The time interval of interest
begins with the initiation of component manufacture and ends with the
termination of the quarantine period. The average number of viable
nrga-iisrs released from the lander onto the planet can be c:T?*tern
n
Sr
mk (r)	 (6)
k=l
where n denotes the number of contamination sources on the lander and
s
where mk(r) denotes the average number of organisms released from the
kth source.
The first step in characterizing the individual sources of
contamination is to partition the lander into a collection of "ele;aentary
physical units", each unit consisting of a continuous volume of a
homogeneous material (e.g., a. screw, belt, length of wire, etc.). F.ach
elementary physical unit can, in turn, be viewed as a collection of
physically distinguishable surface areas and an interior region.
Finally, each surface is partitioned into a collection of "elementary
subsurfaces", each of which is subjected to homogeneous environments
throuLhout the time interval of interest.. For example, if one portion
of a given surface is covered or othe niise protected during some time
interval and the remainder of the Surface is unprotected, then they
constitute different elementary subsurfaces. For present purposes,
the aggregate of all elementary subsurfaces and interiors of
elementary physical units form the total collection of "elementary
sources of contaminaLion". The totality of elementary sources is
enormous and obviously quite unmanageable. The collection is reduced
through the introduction of "source classes" and "equivalence criteria"
which permit the identification of numerous individual sources as a
sint,le combined source. In particular, two elementary sources are
 said to be equivalent if their environments are identical at each point
in time during the quarantine period. A "source class" is then defined
as an exhaustive collection of equivalent elementary sources. For
present purposes, expression (6) can then be applied assuming mk(r)
s
to be the average loading on the kth source class and n to be theS
total number of distinct source classes. Although this interpretation
substantially reduces the magnitude of n  in expression (6) , it is
still likely to be unmanageably
 large. Further simplications will be
introduced after more detailed representation of the various M (r)
are presented.
Consider an arbitrarily selected source cla y s subscripted,
say, '-y the index k. It can be shown (Appendix A) that the mean number
of viable organisms released from the specified source class is
expressible in the form
nk ( r) = m'k ( I) pk ( r )	 (7)
cohere mk (I) = mean number of viable organisms located in the
kth source class at the instant of impact
9
Pk (r) = probability that an randomly selected viable organism
located in the kth source class at the instant o
impact will be released between that instant and the
termination of the quarantine period.
Because of the differing character of possible events occurring before
and after impact, the two factors on the right-hand side of expression
(7) are further discussed separately.
C. Expressions for mk(I)
By definition, all viable organisms contained in the kth
so ,irce class experience essentially the same sequence of environments
throughout the Processing of the mission. Let `t k
J 
Oi	 denote the
sequence of all times at which events occur which markedly affect the
environment insofar as the potential effect on the bio-load of the
source class is concerned. It is shown in Appendix A that, under
certain uniformity assumptions, the average load in the kth source
class at the instant of impact is given by
nk	 rk
mk (I) = mk (C ) r % pks^)+ 6 mk ( 1 ) 	 Pk(s. ) ) +	 .
= 1 	 v=2
^-	 (b)
+ 4 mk ( nk- 1 )Pk ( s nk ) + A mk(nk)
where
mk (G) = Average loading of the kth source class at the
beginning of the time interval of interest
mk (v) = Average increase in loading of the kth source
class during the •jth subinterval of time
f
i
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Pk(sv)	 Probability that a randomly selected organism, which
is located in the kth source class and which is
viable at the beginning of the with subinterval of
time, survives throughout the with subinterval.
For present purposes, expression (a) is reduced to a more
manageable and worLable form by restricting consideration to a selected
few epochs or time points during the pre-impact time interval. This
results in no loss of generality but does require subsequent care in
the characterization of the various pks. The sequence of epochs of
interest are as follows:
1.. Initialization of a piece - part heat cycle.
2. Termination of a piece - part heat cy.A e.
3. Initialization of a flight acceptance heat cycle - f/a cycle
	 i
4. Termination of an f/a heat cycle.	 I
5. Initialization. of a terminal heat cycle.
6. Termination of -'terminal heat cycle.
7. Lander impact on the planet.
Further.it is assumed that (1) no recontamination occurs during the
application of heat treatments and (2) no die-off occurs except
during the application of heat treatments. These assumptions imposed
or. expression (8) lead to the following simplification:
cik (I) = rr'k(0)pk(sl)pk(s2)pk(s3)
+ A III k ( 1 )Pk ( s 2 ) pk ( s 3 ) + A mk ( 2 )pk ( s 3 ) + G mk(3),
where at the kth source class,
mk (0) = Mcan load immediately prior to piece - part heating.
Am-k (l) = Moan recontamination between p_ ce - part and f /a
heating.
t
Amk (2) = Mean recontamination between f/a and terminal
heating.
Am 
k  
(3) = dean recontamination between terminal heating
and impact.
pk (s I ) = Probability that a randomly selected organism,
viable at the beginning of the piece-part heat
cycle, survives the cycle.
Pk
 (s2 ) = Probability that a randomly selected organism,
Iviable at the beginning of the f/a heat cycle,
survives the cycle.
pk (s 3) = Probability that a randomly selected organism,
viable at the beginning of the terminal heat
cycle, survives the cycle.
The initial loadings, N O) s, and the recontamination
loadings, A, k (%,)  s, are, at present, taken to be fixed constants; 1 .e.,
no furti»r modelling of these quantities is included. In particular
applications there are two possible ways of dealing with these
constants. If acceptable (maximum) values are known, they are
appropriately substituted into expression (9). On the other hand,
sensitivity analyses can be performed by appropriately varying the
t
j	 values of these quantities (parameters). This latter approach is use-
ful for evaluating the desirability of future efforts to either (1)
determine the values more accurately or (2) reduce the values through
engineering changes in the mission configuration.
Parameter models presently assumed for the probabilities of
surviving the various heat cycles (i.e., p k (s^)) in expression (9)
take the form of exponential sury °val curves, i.e.,
_ tk%j
Pk ( s v) = 10	
Dkv	
(10)
where 
Dkv 
denotes the D-value associated with the kth source class
12
during; the with heat cyclic- and
	
t	 denotes Lite effective timek
at t•Meh the heat was applied at 1250C- Dk is assumed to be
i	 dependent upon the particular heat cycle under consideration. This is
A necessary in order to allow for, say, a surface which is open through
the f/a cycle but which becomes mated prier to the terminal heatipg.
At this point in t':e development, t k,, is also assumed to depend upon
both t he source class and the particular heat cycle. This allo y-:s for
variability in the thermal lag for the va r ious cycles.
In sum--nary, expression (8) provides a generalized represen•,
tation of mk (I), the average loading at the kth source class at the
instant of impact. expressions (9) and (10) combine to give the
analogous quantity assuming:
1. The possible application of sterilizing heat
2. Expone witial die-off during heat treatments
3. No recontamination during heat-cycles
4. No die-off between heat-cycles
The explicit form of this ccmbination is given by
	
_ / tkl	 tk2	 t1.3
1) _ .(0) 10	
D k 1	 D k 2	 1)k3
(11)
_/ tk2 + t I;3 \	 _ tk3
+ Amk (1) 10 li)k2	 Ii 1,3 ) + L•.mk (2) 10	 DO + ink (3)
This expression will be further reduced in a later discussion of
specific applications.
D. Expr^.ssions for 
Pk 
(r)
By definition, pk (r) represents the probability that a
randomly selected organism. located at the kth source class and viable
13
at the instant of impact, will be released onto the planet during the
period of quarantine. This definition is meaningful and useful only
if the source class is appropriately restricted (Appendix A).
In order to further refine pk (r), it is necessary to give
separate consideration to exterior open surfaces, interior open and
mated surfaces and buried or embedded sources of contamination.
For any exterior open surface source of contamination, it
is assumed that any viable organisms located thereon will be released
immediately upon impacL. This somewhat conservative assumption
corresponds to taking
Pk
 (r) = 1 (exterior open surfaces). 	 (12)
For any interior open or mated surface source of contamination,
release of a viable organism is assumed to occur if the given surface
is directly exposed to the planet as a result of iripact. For present
purposes, the existence of a critical impact velocity, Vkc , is assw-ncd
for each such source class and has the property that direct exposure
will occur if the impact velocity V I exceeds the critical value. If
V 
k 
c
is appropriately selected then a conservative representation of
Pk
 (r) is given by
c	
(13)pk(r) = Prob ` I > k 
(Interior open and mated surfaces)
Pence, insofar as release is concerned, interior open and mated surfaces
are distinguishable from one another only by the particular critical
velocities which are assumed.
Corresponding to any specified impact velocity, V I , release
of a buried organism is assumed to be possible as the result of either
(1) fracture or break-up of the source material caused by planetary
impact or (2) surface erosion occurring betvicen the instant of impact
and termination of the quarantine period. Allowance is also given to
14
the possibility that viable organisms are destroyed as a result of
thermal build-up caused by thc impact. Hence, p k (r) for buried sources
of contamination is expressible in the form (Appendix A)
CO
P ( I ) = J P ( V') i (^; ) )'p (r /V ) + 1 1 - pk (r I /V 1). qk (s/c) pk (r e /V 1 )ldV l 	(14)k	 k ]	 k 1	 1 k. I l
0
where
pk (V I) = Impact velocity distribution function associated
with the kth (buried) source class.
k(V I) = Conditioual probability that. a randomly selected
organism from the kth (buried) source class
survives impact, given impact velocity VI.
pk (r I /V I ) = Conditional probability that a randomly selected
organism, taken from cbe kth source class and
which survives impact, is released as a result of
impact, given impact velocity VI.
qk (s/e) = Conditional prob.ebility that a randomly selected
organism from the kth source class and which
survives impact, survives erosion mechanism at a
t	 particular rate of erosion.
pk (re /V I ) = Conditional probability that a randomly selected
organism, taken from the kth source class and
surviving impact, is subsequently released as a
s	 result of erosion, given impact velocity V I and
given that it is not released as a result of
impact, and survives erosion.
For present purposes g k (Vi) and pk (VI) are assumed to be
empirically determined functions of the impact velocity and, consequently,
no further analytical refinements are offered; q k (s/e) is assumed
to be empirically determined function of the rate of erosion.
It is further assumed that the release of a given buried
organism upon impact requires the occurrence of two separate events.
15
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First, the source material containing the organism must be directly
exposed to the planet's atmosphere, rather than being located ",githin"
the craft. In addition, tlic organism is released only if the material
is fractured upon impact and the organism is located within a distance,
>,, of a newly exposed surface. As developed and discussed in Appendix A,
these and other uniformity assumptions lead to the following expression
for pk(rI/VI):
fk(Vl)
	
Vl>Vk
	
0	 , otheraise
where fk (V I ), the fracture ratio, is equal to the ratio of the surface
area, newly exposed through fracturing, to the total volume of source
material. Obviously this ratio is strongly related to the impact
velocity.
Finally, the release of buried organisms through erosion of
the source material is characterized in terms of a constant erosion
rate acting on a constant area exposed to the planet's atmosphere, i.e.,
	
p(r /V ) = rain	 1	 ek t	
Ak(`JI) I
h e I	 9	 Vk
where
e 
	 = Erosion rate associated with the kth source class.
t	 = Time between impact and termination of quarantine
a
period.
Ak (V I ) = Surface area exposed to the planet's atmosphere.
V 
	 = Volume of material in the kLh source class.
(16)
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Moreover, Ak (V I) can be expressed as the sum of
Ak (0) = Area exposed, assuming no bicak-up of the craft.
A  (1)(V I ) = Additional area exposed as a result: of the source
material brew;;inb away from the craft.
Ak (V I) - Additional area exposed as a result of fracturing
of the source material.
Therefore expression (16) can be expressed
pk(re /V I ) = ek tq [f(')k
	
+ fk ) (V I) + k ( V I ) ]	 (17)
where	 (0)
f (^) _ ^'lc
k	
V 
fkl) (VI) = Ak(1)(VI)
%k
^(vI)
fk (V I )	 V	 (fracture ratio)
k
For im,nediate use of the model, and from an operational point
of view, it is convenient to think of the impact velocity distribution
as a discrete disLribution,i.e., it consists of a particular set of
possible: impact velocities and for each discrete velocity we assign an
a priori probability of occurrence. In such a case the probability of
release of a buried organism located on the kth source reduces to the
following expression
	
pk (r) = gk (V
I 
)L -),p
i
	 (1 - p
i
	 (fo+f lEp i + Ep i f i) qk (s/c)1	 (18)
i
t
17
where the ;UIiâllati011 is taken over all i such that
c
V i ^, V 
and where p i is a preassigned probability for the occurrence of the
impact velocity V..
C
E. Summary
Expressions (4) , (6) , (7) , (11) through (15), (17) and (18)
constitute the generalized planetary quarantine systems model
developed for the present study as well as future applications.
Further simplifications are made for specific applications and
these will be discussed in the following sec_i;,:,.
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III. DISTRIBUTION OF IlU.Tlh'C TIMLSi
A. Objective
Sterilization requirements foi an individual lander imply
appropriate applications of heat to the various portions of the craft.
Operationally, there can be three distinct types of programmed, or planned,
applications of heat, viz,
1. Preassembly heating of individual piece-parts
2. Flight acceptance heating of individual functional.
components and subassemblies
3. Terminal heating of the completely assembled lander
A particular combination of these applications, along with specific ions
of associated portions of the lander and their heating times, constiLites a
"distribution of heating times", i.e., the amount of heat applied to Lhe
various portions of the lander during the p i ece-part, flight acceptance and
terminal processes.
One. extreme distribution,for example, consists solely of applying
a terminal heat cycle which is sufficient, in and of itself, to meet steriliza-
tion requirements. This alternative has the advantage of apparent simplicity,
i.e., it is a "one-shot" operation. However, it could im pose complex, costly
and, perhaps, unacceptable constraints on the assembly and test of the lander.
j	 Moreover, this procedure is likely to be inefficient in that e:^cessivc beat
is applied to par.ti.cul.ar
 portions of the craft in order to provide sufficient
heat at other, thermally less accessible, portions. In addition, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to assess the degradation in engineering reli-
ability resulting from the single application of sufficient heat to meet re-
quirements, vith attendant limitations on subsequent testing (because of the
sterile state of the spacecraft). Finally, costly malfunctions and delay
may result from postponing the application of heat until the lander is com-
letcly assembled and tested.
19
A secone extreme distribution of hcuti lIV ti:n s consists Of
... ,lc h :t at er-ch step in the assembly of the lander to rem0%•c
the r^ :1r1	 possibl a:1J1lt of i o'! ti,miltzltio n at tIl ?t joint In Co pro-
cr s. This -It,,rnati^°c has th: c.: a\ atan^e of i'.ICreasCd t:SSUr^2nCeill. 
mceti.a.,; gll:.'anti nt. regl. irementS. HO-,.-evor, it would rUgUir e_
 the'. imposition
or sterilization requiro:::•_nts 0:1 lov-or tier ccatractors and result in a
larSe dcz rce of redundencc as *'over-kill".
A n-_..:ber o il alternate nixes of 1 10 ating tires can obviously be
postula.ed in tears of their distribution betveen piece-part, flight
acceptance and terminal .- torilization times. Tho analysis reported in
this section relates to the gll ntltativc' f Va lLat iJ.- or such distribltions
and addreLses itscZf to tll_ follc::inJ particular questions:
a. 1 it is desired to nini--ize tc:-,.:ina1 sterilization
ti-: --s, what are tI-e rclativ nai;aitudes of flight
acce ptance aI"4 terminal  sterilization tit-:!s wbc`=) the
minkr: a termin-1 t--__ is attainac ; and, is there
p•analty in th_ total l ..t c:ilich the equipmoat '.-ould bc.-
;ub ;: Ct^d 4^ Z rI111e achicv ink n! in im-7? tin- durin_
ter::inal s^crilizatio:a?
:•:­ill  there be a s1^Ili=1.c?.nt ircrense in heating ti:-.._s
khan the additional constraint is i^posed that luring
tilt term 	 cycle there is no rcq_Iire.-lent for the heat
to reac`7 buriee coma-:inativn?
C.
	 j:il2t	 r., ti, c: -_rits ^f se arztely inc^rior.:tin_ a brat
cyclo on tilc pi;_co-part Iercl in addit ion to heating
tI1CS_ rice-pJrts at tile. fliglit acceptance and teim,,inil
stor;liz. don c}•clus?
B. `1-thod of _1na1- pis
1'o avoid ti:e analytical co-, lc::ities G-llich vould result from a
„._ problcr.I v'I)crci.n st^rilization tim---s are distribute
bCLwocn terminal, flit--Lt ZLec stance and piece-part heating, the approach
noc
dtaken in the analysis was to first restrict the di! z trihution of heat only
to a terminal cycle and the flight acceptance of subassemblies, i.e. as-
suming that piece-parts are not subjected to heat. Results obtained in
this manner are then extended to the case where piece-part heating is
	
i	 included. A computerized version of the generalized systems model,
(Appendix B), t,-as used to analyze th s distribution of flight acceptance
and tcrm4nal heating times.
For present purposos, the sander was conceptually portioned into
four source classes, viz, exterior surfaces, interior surfaces, mated sur-
faces and buried (embedded) sources of contamination. A given location
on the lander is so classified on the basis of it- character in the finally
assembled craft. For example, a location b ich during flight acceptance
	
► 	 testing is an open surface but which is mated to another surface F_ior
to terminal sterilization is classified as a mated surface. In this sense,
	
k	 the individual source classes assmmcd in the present analysis are,in reality,l
composite sourc-^ classes. For this reason, recontamination of the mated
	
'	 source class is allo •.aed for, so as Lo account for thos ,2 mated surfaces which,
during the fligh, acce ptance cycle, were open surfaces.
r-
	
1	 It is also recognized that, operationally, there can be Lwo types
of buried sources of conta-ain p-tion, viz, those sources which are present
U_
	
[	 prior to the flight acceptance cycle and thou^ introduced after flight
I
acceptance, i.e. in the course of final assembly. Therefore, the assun►p-
tion of a single buried source class (w. ithout recontam.ina*_ior- after the
flight acc,-.ptan:-e cycla) is tantamount to assu-muno that no buried sources
of contamination are introduced after the flight acceptances cycle. This
	
^.	 point must be kr,pt in mind when interpreting the results of the present
analysis because, to the extent that this assumption iz. not valid in ac-
tuality , the heating times, reported herein would not be appiicacie.
It i . -as assumed in this analysis that all of the (four) source
classes are subjected to identical (constant temperature) heating times
during the flight acceptance cycle. However, with regard to terminal heating,
two separate cases were considered. In the first case, it is assumed that
all four source cla:;ses are subjected to identical ll^, ating ti.^es. In the
21
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second case it is assumed that exterior surfaces, interior open surfaces,
and mated surfaces are subjected to identical heating times but that
buried contamination receives no terminal heatin< whatsoever. The latter
case was examined because of its considerable operational significance
since it allows for what might be termed "surface sterilization" in the
terminal cycle, i.e. there would be no requirement to reach lethal tempera-
tures in the interior of materials thereby circumventing problems which
stern from thermal inertias and their relate-'. thermal lags.
The final simplifying assumption made for the present analysis
was that only two impact velocities are possible, viz (1) a soft landing
wherein no fracture or breakup occurs and (2) a hard landing associated
with a single velocity %Aiich exceeds the critical velocities of the various
source classes.
C. Analvticzl Model
On the basis of the generalized model described in Chapter II
(expressions 6 through 17) and the preceding assuuriptions and conventions,
the average, or mean, number of organi-ms released ontc the planet is
expressible in the following form:
m(r) _ ^msx(0) 10 -	 + A ms  j	 10 - t.sIDsxDsX
+ P(\'il) {
 FMS (0)  10 - tf /a	 + A ms J	 10 - is/D
Es
+ F10(0) 10 - tLii + A Mrf ] 10 - is/D24
.i
t
♦ mB (0) 10 - f /aD+ t` ts	 P(r/VI,
B
where
ms ~(0), rs (0), ni (0), mB (0) = average bi_o-load (exterior, interior
open, mated and buried, respectively)
subjected to fli€ht acceptance heating
Amsx , dis, Antl`I	 = average recontamination loads (exterior,
interior open, mated, respectively)
between f).ight acceptance and terminal
heating
22
rA
X­3
Ds- , 0S , Dpi, D I!	 =	 125 0C resistance values for exterior,
interior open, mated and buried con-
tamination sources, respectively
P(Vil)	 = probability of a hard landing
t f/a	 = flight acceptance heating time (constant
temperature equivalent)
i s	 = terminal heating time (constant
temperature equivalent
l	 if buried contamination "sees" terminal heating
b
0 	 otherwise
This reduced form of the generalized model, along with appropriate
values f r the various parameters, was used to evaluate the distribution
of 
-
flight acceptance and terminal heating times which meet the implementation
requirement m(r).
D. Parameter Values
Table III-1 defines the magnitudes of parameter values used in the
analysis. As shocm in the table, this is done in two categories. The first
group of parameters, shown in the upper part of the table, have been assigned
fixed values in all of the runs. The second group was assigned lim'ting
values, to represent the range which these parameters are likely to assume.
The basis for placing a parameter in one or the other of the above two cate-
gories has been the relative uncertainty of its numerical magnitude.
The value of m(r) is based upon a probability of growth, p"(g)=10-3
and an allocation for landing vehicles p(N) =10- 6 . The D values given in the
table are those currently provided by she NASA Planetary Quarantine Office
to the Vik 4.ng Project for the development of sterilization requirements. As
t
	
	
regards	 the probability of a hard landing, P(VII), this parameter could
readily be given a range of values extending beyond 10-1 , to say, 10 -3 or 10-4.
This was not done since there is considerably more uncertainty with other
aspects of microbial release, contained in the term P(r/V li) - the probability
Ak
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3of release given that hard landing has occsrred. This latter parameter is
included in the category for which a range of values has been used.
The mennini; of the % orst" and "best" case parameter values
given in Table III-1 for the various microbial loads and the conditional re-
lease probability P(r/\'ji) deserves some elaboration, particularly in view
of the somewhat arbitrary way in which the numerical ma, itudes are assigned
to their limiting values.
Either for the 'Vorst" or "best" case, a projection has been made
into the future as to the values Mch might be achieved for a gi ven para-
meter depending upon the amount of effort that is applied. But such an
effort suggests a cost, whether of a monetary value or other types of cost,
e.g. complexity in implementation, impact on equipment reliability, etc.
As an illustration, consider the value of the conditional release probability,
P(r/V11). If the '' orst" case value of unity is assumed there wculd obviously
be no need for any effort to defend the fact that this is, indeed, the
i	 'b,orst" case. Similarly, an initial. microbial load of 107 might not re-
quire extensive decontamination procedures,or elaborate bio-assay to justify
that the load is of the given order of magnitude. These types of benefits
must,hoc:ever, be weighed against a possible penalty in increased heating
tines, either in flight acceptance or termiral sterilization. The "best"
case, on the other hand, implies a cost which might stem frorn more complex
bio-assay, extensive decontamination or clean-room assembly procedures, or
difficulty in defending a loner value for the conditional release probability.
These costs then need to be weighed against potential benefits in reduced
heating times.
In summary, the "best" and 'worst" case conditions are meaningful
only in the context of the present analysis in that they represent a qualita-
tive "cost" or a "benefit" in the implementation of sterilization require-
ments to be compared against the quantitative cost/benefit of heating times
i	
in terminal and flight acceptance cycles.
The particular values which were chosen for the "worst" and "best"
case conditions derive from a general knowledge of the current state-of-the-art
25
relative to these parameters. They were arrived at both from an assess-
ment of published information and by discussion with knowledgeable people
in this field.
E. F^sul.ts
Four separate series of computer runs were made using the model
defined by expressions 6 through 18 and the parameter values provided in
Table 1I1-1. The series were distinguishable as to (a) whether the "best"
or 'ti•.,orst" case parameter values were assumed and (b) whether buried con-
tamination was or was not subjected to hezt in the terminal cycle. Computa-
tion within a given series consisted of determining the minimura terminal
heating time required in order to meet implementation requirements, for a
specified (run dependent) value of the flight acceptance heating time.
Figures I1I-1 through 71II-4 indicate the terminal and total (terminal plus
flight acceptance) heating times plotted against flight acceptance heating
i	 time for each of the four situations considered.
For the situations wherein buried contamination is not subjected
to terminal heatin g , minimum flight acceptance heating times are required in
order to meet implementation requirements. This follows from the fact that
below a certain level of fli ght acceptance heating the surviving buried load
is unacceptably large, because it is not subjected to terminal heating.
To make a meanin gful comparison of the four runs summarized in
Figures III-1 through III-4 it is useful to focus on that value of t f /a at
which the terminal sterilization time, t s , is at a minimum,for, clearly,
at larger valises of t fla Uic total time would increase without any benefit
either in terminal time or in total time. These data points are sum,-narized
in Table II1-2, shoeing the terminal and flight acceptance heating times for
the "best" and the 'worst" cases and distinguishing between the two conditions
where buried contamination either is or is not subjected to lethal heat
during the terminal cycle..
r
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A n=ber of observations may be pertinent with reference to the
data slim-n in Table III-Z::
a. As long as the requirenmont is imposed that sterillizing
heat must reach the interior of all materials during
terminal sterilizzi-ion, there is a flexibili ty for
distributin;; a 'required total ainic-Lint of heat between
flight acceptance and terminal cycles. 	 The data in
Table I1I-2 shcws the limiting case .here the terminal
' tine has been minimized at the expense of increased
flight acceptance time. 	 Hol:ever, the sum of these two
values could be distributed in any other desired ci^-.i-
bination so long as the sum of the two remains the same.
b. Referring to the eater applicable to the case where there
is no heat penetration requirem ent in the terminal c}cla,
any redistribution between terminal and flight acceptance
time must b_ at a penalty- to the total time which the
equipm--nt will sec.
c. The nucuarical data in Table III-2 provides an indication
of the extent to u-bich uncertainties of the parameter
valves will influence the leng-h of heating times. For
exariple, the terminal sterilization tin y could vary by a
factor of about 2, whereas the corresponding flight
acceptance times would be affected by about a factor of 3.
d. Terminal heating tines are affected by the fact that heat
penetration is not required in the terminal cycle, regardless
of whether the "best" or "worst" case parameters are aSSItmed.
The penalty in this ap_•roach is in the flight acceptance
heating tim--s, but the magnitude of this penalty is not
very significant. Foi: example, in the "best" case situation
the fliglit acceptance time increas:._: to 18 hours frura 15
hours and in the '4:-orst" case it increases to 50 hours from
43 hours. But these incre.a.- s must be weighed against the
e
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considerable benefit which accrues from Cie fact that
heat is not required to penetrate into those portions
of the spacecraft which have substantial Lhermal inertia
and thereby cause other parts of the spacecraft to ac-
quire more total lethalty than is necessary.
The preceding analysis dealt exclusi'V.ely with thc- distribution of
heating tiros between the terminal and flight acceptance cycles. The
question of further distributing the required heat to the piece-parts
level can nua he considered on the basis of the above results. The p ­i-
cedure is almost analogous tc that used a.,ove in that one might consider
the heat distribution between flight acceptance.and piece-part heating on
the assumption that the total amount of heat required is that derived above
for the fli3lit acceptance cycle. The model for such an analysis would again
require an identification of an initial buried load contained within piece-
parts, and subsequent recontamination in the process of assembly. This
latter source is a much more likely .possibility at the sub-assembly level
in that such assembly processes frequently involve thc use: :.f encapsulating
materiLls. It is evident, ho-..ever, that when such an anal ysis is clone on
a quzntitative basis, it will lead to the conclusions reached for ne
distribution of heat between terminal anu flight acceptance timos. It is,
therefore, concluded that piece-part het.ting x:,ould be desirable only on a
selective basis when the follo•An^L, conditions exist, either separatel y or
in combin g tian:
a. A piece-part is kno;:m to contain a relatively high
initial buried load and it is desired to reduce this
load so as not to penalize ether parts in the assembly
which would not require a comparable amount of heat.
b. A piece-part is known to be marginal in terms of its
ability to c:Athstand prescribed heat levels and it is
de-fired to establish its functional capabilities at
an early enough stage in the assembly process so as
to avoid the cost due to malfunction at a later stacye.
c. A piece-part is known to bave a high thermal inerti%
so as to cause difficulty in achieving uniform heating
at the assembl y level. relative tc other part in the
assembly.
d. In the event that a less conscrv.tive value of the
i -
	conditional release probability is iltiniately used,
E
	
	 based upon a nominal fracture ratio for spacecraft-
materials, and a particular piece-part is known to be
unusually fragile and, therefore, inconsistent 4-ith the
chosen nominal fracture ratio, such a piece-part could
L'	 be selectively subjected to a beat- cycle to reduce its
i
	
	 dominant contribution to the probability of survival
of buried organisms in that piece.
r}
IV. Sfa;tiITiV1Tl ANALYSIS
A.	 Og )j(-ct iv-
As indicat ed in the preceding section of this report, significant
reductions in flight acceptance and total heating time: can be obtained by
demonstrati.n', or otherwise j-istifying, the best-case param^ter values.
llo-wever, uefor y e-mbarking; on efforts to demonstrate or produce less conser-
vative parameter values, it would be of interest to know the benefits, in
terms of reduced heating times, resulting front less-than-worst-case values
of these parameters. This section is, therefore, devoted to estimating
and comparing reductions in terminal and flight acceptance heating; times
resulting from improvements in individual parameter values.
E. M^t1101 of Analysis
In principle, the benefits of reduced heating: times resulting from
an improvement in the value of any given parameter c^.n be obtained from a
knowledge of the relationship between the required flight acceptance and
terminal heating times and the parameter itself. 11iis relationship dept:ds,
however, unon the assumed values of the remaining parameters. To avoid
}	 these complex interrelationships, the approach auopted herein is to examine
the reductions in "optimum" flight acceptance and terminal heating times
separately resulting from improvements in particular parameter values. It
will be recalled that optimum in t h is sense refers to the flight acceptance
and terminal heating times when terminal. heating is essentially minimized
'	 and flight acceptance heating is minimiz^d for that minimum terminal time.
t
	 For present purposes it is assumed that reductions in heating times
!	 at the optimum values are relatively insensitive to t:hother the buried con-
Lamination is or is not subjected to terminal heating. This appears justified
on the :oasis of the data contained in Table 11I-2 and Figures ITI-1 through
1II-4 of the preceding section. Thus, for the case where buried contamina-
tion is subjected to terminal heating times tlic, difference betweer. '4:,orst"
and "bast" case heating times is 4 lours for is and 28 hours   for t f / a . In
the case c:here buried contamination is not subjectL. Lo terminal heating
35
1the corresponding differences are 4 and 32 hour for is and ti/ a respectively.
Vz: iat ions of these magnitudes are not consi_dored significant in the prevent
t
sensitivity analysis as they will not influence thc concluFions concerning
Hic relative effect of parameter va l ues on heating times	 Ilierefore, the
analysis presented in this section is based only on the case i-:here the
buried contamination receives terminal heating.
The parameters investigated consist of the constraint m(r), the
initial mv-ted and buried bio-loads, the recontamination of mated surfaces,
the probability of a hard landing and the probability of release of buried
contamination, conditional upon hart] landing. Th? analysis of the preceding
section does not justify further consideration o f exterior and interior open
surface contamination, oiling to the relative'.} . small D-value associated with
these contamination sources.
The approach adopted for measuring the sensitivity of heating times
t	 to the individual parameter values can be itlustratc<; in terms of the
probability of release of buried contamination. Figure IV-1 indicates the
dependence of the r_quired terminal tine associated v:-ith prescribed flight
acceptance heating times. As indicated, the individual c •-irves are distinguished
by the assum:d valise of the release probability Pb(rhIt) which, in this
f	 case, is allowed to take intermediate values betv,een the worst and best
case values, (i.e., p(r) = 1, 2 x 10 -2 , and 2 x 10 -3 ). Worst case values
of all other parameters, as defined in Table III-1 of the preceding section,
were used in devclopin c, these curves. Accepting the criterion that tf/a be
selected to be the minimum value uhich "essentially" minimi7es the terminal
heatins time. The following approximate dependence of t f/a and i s upon Pb(r/VH)
results:
p  ( r"/Vli )	 tf/a	 is
1	 49	 7
2 x 10 -1	 37	 7
2 x 10-2	 31	 7
2 x 10-4	 27	 7
z
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`	 The values for t: f /a in this table were r, ad from the individual
t	 rurvcs ar those value:: tAtcre Llie tCrn,ina-1 it-at in& times effectively settle
r	
do,..,n to a constant value, i.e., any increase in t f/;t buys very little, if
any, reduction in Germinal heating time and any decrease ir. L f/a tends to
increase the total h^ating t:me. 'lltcse particular results indicate that a
ono order of magnitude decrease in P 11 (r/V1t ) produces a 25 percent decrease
in f/a hent-ing time x1iereas each successive order of magnitude decrease
in P B (r/Vit ) results in substantially less reduction iu t f/a . 110:•'ever,
improv:meuts in P B 0-/%1 	 result in essentially no reduction in the terminal
heat i ng time.
C. Resul t
1'he approach described above for evaluatint! the effect of the
conditional p:--bability of release was also applied Lo all the other parai,i-
eters considered in this section. Figures 1V-1 through IV-5 provide the
data on terminal time variation versus f/a time for each of the par-metcrs,
considering both the worst and best cases for the parameter studied. I'liese
curves were than used to produce the suiru-nary data slho-,m in Table IV-1.
Referring to Table IV-1, the previously used best and worst case
heating times are noted in this table for reference purposes. To illustrate
the use of this table, consider again the parameter PB(r/V11) for the proba-
bility of release given hard impact. If this parameter could be demonstrated
to assume the best value of 2.1 x 10 -3 then the corresponding change in
tvirlinal sterilization tirn .- ..?ould be as given in the table, i.e., it would
remain at 7.1 hours with 0 percent improvement since it corresponds to the
worst case for all param:, tors. 11o • over, the flight acceptance cycle heating
time would change from the worst case value of 49 hours to 21 hours, pro-
ducing a 57 percent reduction in flight acceptance time clue entirely to
the change in the value of the probability of release. The fact that this
probability of release has no cffcct on terminal sterilization Lime is , adi.ly
explained since it is 4zskciated entirely with buried contamination which is
reduced, almost exclusively, in the flight acceptance cycle.
3°
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f l,i C	 it: • t^: , t t0 inL: O^	 v=:	 ' 	 ;aa 1;	 :c i7.	 for ..1rti-
	tltt• in it in 	 t itrie: Ic', .'I c%i	 .	 Av.,itl, Litt- -ter:.:il-A'-
	
l 	 '^
	it i t ucr:ee.' b- a red.,c t ion of the bt r iod load f re:a	 4
t. li► 7 tv the best c:tse-value : 104 . lloidevcr, fiirlit
1 }, rt.uc• ' iron the worm ca ,;c condition of 49 hours
t	 Irs thl-vt ) i c,ir.imiz atiol: of 010 initial burrd loa, t .	 (heft rrinl;
it	 1.	 T an analy: i• .:a< also nn.Ic of th- ef.'vct of thc• initial c.ated
.l ., tlti 1ond '.1lich 1G present in Ot nated surfaces of syaLecraty.
Iit'_. it is evident from this gra p!l that this initial hate--1 lead
Ito::	 i.-nifica;it influ=,nco either on terlainal or flight acceptance heating, times.)
fable Iv-I silo•_= s that Ote terr:inal sterilization tine could be
influc-rc ed 	the parsmoters F(VH)--the probability of bard iripact, &N -
the teea ` • tr_ 7 -na tlon occurring on :7 ted surfr:c 	 fallo::ing fIidl:t acceptance
:.nd the requ_rom•-•nt R (v►.ich reflects either the allocation given to larding
v.14cler or tilt value of probahility of groAn on the plr-net). These three
p y rara::tc=rs incl ividually pro.Iucc : reduction of ap_,rovilnately tv.o hours, or
30 percent each, in the terrtira I. sterilization tire. The} clso inf lu-c•nee the
flight acce,,tanc•- tim , but to a lesser degre=e than the probability of release
F B (r /VH ) or the initial bur i-cd load.
Th '! effect of P!vHl and n nn tQ m.nal stet it ization times is readily
explained by the fact that these param,:ters = l eal largely with post flight accep-
tance events. To the extent that these• parnmeters also influence prt'-flight
acceptanc reglliri--"-ntr, they produce a small but noticeable effect on
flight acce•ptaltec' heatiil n times.
In utilizing the data provided in T^ble IV-1, it nnist U. recognized
that the rcductions in heatiili; tie...-s relate to the effect of each parameter
Laken one at a time_ "Siur, if all tile parar--tars are imprcved to their
best values the best cr•.se hv.iting times taoa_d of course result, as sho::n in
the p,cce2ing section. lio: :•ever, tal:in- nny co:n:.:nation of im • roved parameter
v; lees c i 1 i yield an ix t)rov.:ment In the heating times approximately, but not
exactly, in accordrntce with the sue: of the percentages indit.ated in the table-.
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The sen::i.tivity data providod horein shoos the yuanti.fiable b,-.Ti(-fits
'	 resulthi.-,, from pnrametc•r valu,^ impro-vi- cnts ill 	 of heating times. The
&-cisioa to etil nrh upon progr. ,s which ui ll tai t-Ouce Lliesc vilut S dcpen.ls,
however,. oil additional and, ill 	 ungu: nt i f iable considerations. AI t11ouol ►
no attempt is node here "o develop and justify an optin na program H:hich
%-:11 1, from a cost benefit- paiiii of vie::-, minii:dze equipment heating times,
a few considerations -:re  wortli noun, . For example, those concerned %-Ath
project implementation of a landing scission may wish to consider 1r. ,-thods for
either coutrvlling or accurately estirmLi_ng conLamination loads for !)uried
contmiiln tion and recout.srination of mated _urfaces during filial assembly.
Viese parameters alone can produce a significant change both in tenninal heat-
ing as well as flight accepLai,ce heating times. Furtll:rmore, project
pL•rsrinlel also hive an influence over the -ztimation and possibly control
of the probabili ty of a hard landing, since this parameter is closely related
to equipment reliability. `Mis factor call 	 influence teriainai flight
acceptance heating ti:-` s, On the other liana, par^neters dealing with tl ► c
imposed requirements, F, or the probability of release given a hard landing
P B (r/V1i ), ar.• subject. to different types of judgment. 711ese latter factors
can also contribute significantly to reduction of te:m.i.nal and flight accep-
taitce heating times and the section which follo.- . treats the esti p:atioil of
P  (r/Vlt ) in greater detail
i
!i
i
r
t
V.	 ESTRIAT1ON' OF M10:01MAL nEixi—,SE P"rouii8IL1TIFS
i
A. Objective
in the prece<".rb sensitivity analysis two parameters were
considcred relating to the release of nicro-org.nisms from t'.c-
spacecraft onto the planet surface. They were, respectively P (Vl;1,
the probability of a hii;h velocity impact, and 11B (r,/V 11), the prob-
ability of release giver that a hit)i velocity impact has occurred.
Both of these parameters i•=ere found to significantly influence
sterilization times in terminal as well as flight acceptance cycles.
Hot-!ever, different considcraLiors enter into the process of reducing;
'	 these parameters to the preferred values which yield benefits i_:.
{	 sterilization heating times.
{	
A high velocity impact is, as previously defined, one which is
j	 greater then the velocity for which n lander has been desig7ed. Such
`	 an anoniilouz impact velocity can occur from any combination of: (1)
i	 excessive trajectory entry angle, allowirb insufficient retardr_tioa
by aerodynamic drab; (2) unaccounted-for atmospheric conditions,
e.g. density or composition; and, (3, malfunctions in the decent/re-
tardation syste-in. Hie ciag;nitude of the ano7malous impact velocity will
vary (see discussion in reference 1) according to the combination of
l
	 events which produce it. Similarly, the probability of its occurrence
will depend. ,in part, 1pun tiie magnitude of the velocity considered.
It is evident, therefore, that in analysis of the probability of high
velocity impact must concern itself with detailed mission and space
vciricie desire characteristics. The cost benefit considerations are,
in this case, entirely mission specific and must be evaluated by
project personnel in terms of (1) the benefit of reduccd heating; times
which result frc-m smaller values for the probability of accidental
impact and (2) the difficulty of estimating and defending probabilities
of high velocity iripact substantiall y sr..aller than 0.1. Furtlier
.analysis of P(V )i) in the context. of this study is, therefore, not useful.
An entircly different s i tuation exists with respect to the
prob:!h; 1 i t y (*f re • '. ase given that . high velocity it -pact h s occarrec'.,
P1,(r/!'1i). Currently this ca o _ailionnl release probabilit; i-c rssoci-
ated with t%:t) dominant physical nechanisnis. One of tbcso denIs wiLli
the bi,-akup of spacecraft c_aterials upon impact and the resultant
release of t-iticro-ort. ralsms I'= fr..ctured surfacer. I - he second mech-
anise, is that of crn^,on of sp^acecr^ft surfaces, including the
sin'fnces of fractured pieces. These two processes contain a number
of parameters uno,r khic•. tho estin-tion of the probability of re-
lease depends. Thus, in c yder to assess the reali'rability of lee:er
condition=l release problnbility values, it is necessary to i_nvestizate
=	 the various parameters involved in the formulation of release mechanisms.
The principal purpose of the apglicatien study summarized herein ha;
tL	 been to i^.31e such an esti^-!-Lc in order to provide a basis for assess-
in- the difficulty an:: the specific steps involved in derivinn and
- 'r- fcndin;; lower conditional release probability values. This could
then be weighed a-ainst the benefits in reduced heating tivc—s which till
t.	 accrue from such lo:.?. -•r values.
B. Method of Analysis
The analytical framework used in the analysis is of limited
scope its that it encompasses, at this point, only the major factors
1	 which enter into fiacLure and erosion r-echnnisms and their inter-
dependencies. The sir:plificstions utilized in order Lo derive a
_	
Lorknblc• analytical basis included the following:l
A. The gencralized equation for the probability of release
as given in intergal form in equation (14) was reduced to
the considerrtion of a sir-le velocity only.
L. As previously described, the pr-bability of microbial
release fro-1 open surfaces has been taken as unity, the
probability of release from meted surfaces was taken to
be equal only to the probability of high velocity impact,
i.e. Vie probability of release given impact is taken as
unity. The only remaining factor is, therefore, the prob-
ab:lity of release, given impact, for buried contamination.
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The analytical foYmi:lation of probability of release given
impact for buried contamination whicli results f.rum the above simplif-
yin,, assumptions is s mnari-ed below.
(V	 l. ]Ik (r I /V )-+- ^ 1 - l' ]` ( r I /V ) j (I (s/e) r (r /V )-}: e	 l
for V I > Vk	 (1)
where P 1- ( r I /V I ) is defined as the probability of release due to impact
at impact velocity V I , and is r-iven by
- r	 f (V 1 )	 VI > VC	 (2)k
0	 o theiwis e
and Pk (re /V l ) is given hy
ek tq1 f (°) + i (1 (V1) + fk `1 
I) V l > \1 k (3)
P k ( re /V' I ) _	 {	 (o)
ek t  f	 othen-ri.se
The definitions of parameters used above are as follo;:s:
^.	 - effective dept]: of exposure
C	 - rate of erosion (assumed to be constant)
t 
	 - quarantine time
f (o)	 - ratio of area e;cposed to initial volume assuming no broai, up
f (1)	 - ratio of additional area exposed as a result of the
source breaki.n c, away from the craft: to initial volume
f1. (V l ) - fracture ratio associated with the kth source at a
given impact velocity
g k (V I) - conditional probability Hint a randomly selected organ-
isii from the kth (buried) source class survives impact,
given impact velocity VV
qk (s/e)- conditional probability that a randomly selected organ-
ism from the 1:th source class and which sup vives impact,
survives erosinii mechanism at a particular rate of erosion.
G^
l:vcn Lite above simplified forrMlati011 contains too many indivi-
dual par:•,:'Lcrs to be amenable to quantitative analysis in tli< light
of the verb- limited state c , ' knowledge about Lbc- mc•el:anis-.-. involved
and the para-meters associated %, , i th then. Furthc r quantitative
s-mplifications are therefore necessary at this point. Some of these
are readily made without penally in the study. For example, a fixed
value for tie period of qu:,rantine, t q , can realisticly be assured
and the value of 17 years ::gas used i ll the analysis. Furthermore, the re-
lative ma-nitudes off (o) and I(1 , comnparod to fl;(V	 are such that the first
two can be assigned fixed values based upon on estimate of surface ar.a
to total volume of a typical spacecraft in an intact conditon. lio::ever,
the fracture ratiofk (V l) was allows-d to vary up to a magnitude of 10 5 1/m
for the rea sorb described belov,.
Since the estimam ion: of fracture ratios for different spacecraft
r
-	
mate-rial.s an i or;.r z ranee of impact velocities is r co::ple ': task, it is
f
useful to obtain somo appreciation for the physical significance of the
numerical magnitudes involved.- It is particularly relevant to bound the
magnitude of the fracture ratio in for context of microbial release. For
these purposes, cCnsider a cube of solid material measuring one foot
(0.3 r:cters) or, each side. Assum_, next, fliaL this cube is successively
part;ti.oned (fractured) into smaller sub-cubc-s of equal size. Table V-1
t indicates the fracture ratios (nou'v e-:posed areas divided by the original
volume of one cubic foot), the resultin,; nu-ber of fractured s,jb-cubes
and the corresponding dimension of the sub-cube. Thus, a fracture ratio
of 103 (in units of 1/m) implies a break-up of tlie original cube into
150,000 pieces (sub-cubis). iSore sienificantly, however, a fracturi' ratio
of 6 x 10^ lmplvies complete pulvcrizntion into one micron pieces. Since
the size of micro-organisms is about one micron, a fracture ratio of about
10(' is the upper bound which could reasonably be considerec: for our par-
poses, i.e. igaorin<; 11 b1'oik.1go" of micro-organisms, it is the liniting
valw.- at which all organisms present would be released from the surrourdin,_
material.
11 9
Illustrative Fracture Ratios for a One foot Cube
No. of
fractored
Cubes
2.00
1. 5 x 105
1.2 y lUR
1.2	 1 C
I	 10"
2. _ ;: M' c
Dinic-nsion
200 inin
50
6
620 µ
62 ►
6.2
1.0It
Fracture raLi0 - Ifni
10'
1 C''
l U^`
1U^
10``
10°
6 x]U`
I
•	 50
DeLortillnaLion of a numerical magnitude for the exposure depth
coefficient, ?., can be apI)ro.iclied from an fnPuiti.ve as well as .1--1	 ^
	
_	
experimenta0. point of vice•:. 	 lnLulLively, it,,; ium-Crical vAtle would	 14
seem to b ", clos=ely related to th(-. physical dime=nsion of a rticro-
organism. For, as noted earlier, this parameter effcctivoly derines
thr depth below the- exposed surface wherc a micro-organism, if present,
j
would be considered to have been exposed in the sense thaL it would be
capable of groi-Ali and spreading oil 	 pl-inet. Thits, assuming t.h,
average dimension of micro-organisms to be about 1 micron, letting
= 1;; would imply that so long as any part of the organism is visible
	
t^	 at the exposed surface, it is considered to have been released.
Tile value OF X was also derived experimentally (Peterson, et al 3)
by the controlled fractnr.e anti culturing of sample materials into %.Bich
a prod ctermi.ned nur,-tber of viable organisms war, encapsulated. The value
of ) derived in this manner was about 2.8 microns. To reconcile it with
the intuitive value of X = 1 micron, it could reasonably be argued that
the experimental values reflect, in part, the depth of penetration of
the nutricnL medium beloo the exposed surface, and/or that the actual
area exposed by fracture is not the smooth surface represented by the
measurements. Such a reconciliation is, however., hardly worth the effort
in view of the much greater uncertainties which nre currently associated
with other parameter:. in the meciel, in general, and %-.ith the release dut_-
to impact, in particular. A value of It = 1 micron :!a^, therefore, used
in the quantitative exercise of the release modal.
^I
L
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I'll( . parnmn.Lcr c, given rl^ the rate of material erosion in meters per
t	 year, represents a crude mcnlel of the release of micro-ort,-InIslils clue to
cro::ion: IL simply ass111e0s tl-nt as spacecraft sitrf;iccs ar eroded clue to
their exposure to the pinn.tnry cnvlronment, small pieces of material are
removed in layers and in this process, micro-or.nni.snM contained in the
rwifcri:il arm rel.casc •d. Althou,,h more cletai.led exnminntion of erosion peo-
i
cessrs on l)lnllCt.lry surfaces is curreni_ly i.n progress: (rc, . 2), analysis re-
pored herein could not ns yet benefit from more realistic representntions.
I-or this reason, the range of values assumed in the quantitative analysis
for e is somculint arbitr .-ry and includes values from 10 -1 meters per year to
10-6 meters per year. It remains to be established whether this is a re-
prescntntivc ran o.o, but it appeared intuitively appropriate at the present
1	 time.
i
t	 In view of the above uncertainties in quantitative value; of material
f	 erosion parameters, it r.lso did not scam reasonnhle ;.o separal-Ay assign a
tl	range of value; for the probability of microbiol survival in the course of
erosion. There is some indication from cxp:!rirnental fork that a process
vbich croJcs herd materials at s hi,h rate would involve energies also cap-
able of rendering at least n portion of the microorganisms contained in the
}	 material non-vinble. Thtis, thy. probability q (s/c), representing the survival
`	 of riicroogg anisms during erosion, is liholy to be less than unity. Ilowever,
for the purposes of the present preliminary analysis this probability was
taken as unity. For si+ni.lar reasons the probability of microbial survival
in the course of fracture wns also taken to be unity even though there is
more concrete rvidence from laboratory experimcntatinn (ref., 10) indicating
B 'efini.te 'nstructiVC process in the course of fracturing; at high velocities,
apparently due to the heat generated in this process.
C. Results
Ihe pr. ulcipal benefit from the analysis per.f-ormed to date is the identifica-
tion of areas of uncertainty, the clarification of which is likely to lend
to reduced values of release probabilities. To illustrate this, reference
is made to FiL;ure V-1 in whirl, tho probability of release given high velocity
impact, I' (r;'l'
I: 
), is platted against the fracture ratio, f , wlth the erosion
l; 
rate c as a parameter.
	
In term• of tlIc- limits used i.n the sensitivity anal.ys;i.s,
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^LI II
11 Ai, 1, 1
10
I.
Ad
mc-ters per yc-,M'
III	
Ij
i
lC	 10
f	 Fracture Ratio ) ]/I II
Fig.	 V -, I
Co l oploual release prolwhility an n funellon
of flilcIIII . C.—m lo mid vvom.jon vale
the dc;;1 ►'cd ]oamr val ue of 11 ( r /1'lt ) of about. 2 x 10 - 3 would be rca] i•r.rd
if tho fracture ratio could 1W dcu ►onr;traLcd to be 10 2 while the erosion
rate Jr. l:ilcrn al. 10` 6 "1 or ? micron per year. 'rhino paromoOr values
are about: 10 lo ►aW that could rensonnbly be connidcred aL this tin-.	 I
lkiwever, as nntcd enrl.ivr, no r.] lowanev is made herein fen • microbial de;t rnc• -
kion both in the cunrse of fracture as well as in the process of erosion.
Their inclusion could make tho target of n, ( ► Acli) 10--" all 	 toinabl.e ont•.
llo ►acNc; • , c• onii.derably more work is r.equit • cd Co formulaLe a defensible
mvelmnism for the erosion process Jn terms of parameters of UK antici.paLed
envi.rvnment. oil 	 planet: :;urfnce as well on of the physicnl processes in..
volved. Furthormore, the selection of n fracture r, t.i.o cannot be made
indeprndvnt of velocil ion of impact a nd the correlation bohmvn the chosen
fractury ratio and the most probable in,pnct velocity umst a]se be idontif.ied.
(For example, n disLribul tui, of velocities and the ern-responding fracture
ratios can be used to derive an expected fracture ratio, suiLable for analysis
purposes.)
Some of tho recommended work described above: is currently in progress
bot I ► at Exotech and by other- orgnnixotions with Ll, support of the NASA
Planetary Quarantine office. The results Wich will be for Ibcoming should
provide a lwt.ter basis for cstimuoing the probnbility of microbial re' ase.
The a;ork reported herein provides n framework by which such results call
corre]ated to the development of heat sterilization requirLnonts.
5^►
Vi. CONI I,l1Sl0N. ANI) 11EVU-i`EW)ATJONS
Anrll) tic aI ulodcIs and tIwir nppIication!, serve n dual function in
providily, m bmsis for spacec;aft stcriliznlion.	 Furtltc, rn r -t I , these. two
ft ► nctiol"t art` ovcHahping, ant i t1w process, of analysis is an iterative one..
Thus, mt mny poi-t: in ti.ule, a lnodcl 0111 be formulated to define steriliza-
tion vt qui.remonts based on ctn'rc<nt undcrsLanding; and using existing; dal:a.
Sucb a wodcl can also be enlarged to include as yet tntl;nown aspects, so
as Lo evaluate the need for additional dr to and to order tlt( , priorities
for further resenrcll mid dovclopment.. As now data becomes available,
tho models can also be enlarged to provide a better representation of tllc
problem, and the process )•eiteraLed.
Efforts to data reflect a number of i.Lerations in the above sense.
'11111s, it is a chmraeterist-i.c of early models and their a; plicacions that
they were analytical]) , simple but results(] in conservative requirements.
it was also to be cxpcct:ed that, as the data base and understanding broadened,
Me models vould beconl,- analytically more calllplex. The analytical mode,.
developed under this pro-rant was formulated in sufficient generality Lo
suit pro}rctcd Future applicrltions as t:cll as application studios of current
inLerest, c.g. titos.e described berein.
1 Extensim o. luodifi.cation of the model needs to be considered in the
foi i ow i n;; area";
`	 (a) Estinlatiou of nacrobial release probabiliLics, to better
t
	 account for fracture and ero:.ion processes w1li.le rclatingo
to parameters of the planetary environmcnL (cur.rr.ntly in
progress at Exotech under Contract NASw-1734.
(b) EvaluatJoa of alternate ropresent:ations of microbial
survival, in lieu of the exponential model, e.g. the
stochastic diffusion Model being; developed by Exotech or
the kinetic 1:01ctio'l-rate model being; developed at Sandia.
The ben, fits of such 1110de1s from a Sy:.tenls point of view
nl:oo dez;o vc investigation.
(c) Inclusion of in- flight recontamination into the model.
55
f
i..
(d) Extension of the model to provide an operational tool
in making allocations to individual spacecraft sub-
assemblies, in a m:-nner analogous to that used in
reliability analysis and control.
With renrd to the implementation of sterilisation requirements on
a flight project, attention is invited to the following:
1. There is considerable merit to the approach wherein the
contribution of buried loads to planetary contamination
is essentially removed in the course of flight acceptance
heating, provided no new buried contamination is produced
thereafter. This approach allo:•:s the restriction of heat
in the terminal cycle to open and mated surface.; which were
contaminated after flight acceptance.
}	 2. A desirable corollary to (1) above is the fact that terminal
sterilization times are significantly smaller than flight
acceptance heating times, without significant penalties in
!	 the total cim3 which equipm nt urould be subjected to heat
(the ratio of t f/a to i s is between about 5 and 7, depending
upon whether the "best" or "worst" case parameter values
are assumed).
3. The t:e of piece-part heating appears to be of merit only
Oil a ;elective basis, depending upon whether the part is
heat labile., has high thermal inertia, has excessive buried
contamination or is unusally fragile.
4. Surface contamination is not a critical factor from the point-
of-view of heat sterilization requirements. In this sense,
it should not require high accuracy estimation or costly
controls.
5. Mated contamination produced after flight-acceptance is a
14,	
significant factor in determining the terminal heat cycle
 but it is not obvious whether the 2-3 hours whichwould be
 gained through control and accurate estimation of this
L
contamination source would be consistent with the cost of
achieving this benefit.
r
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G. Buried contamination is a significant factor in deter-
mining the magnitude of the f/a cycle, and the develop-
ment of better tec'.-niques for estimating this load
should be given em;.liasi.s.
7. The demonstration of probabilities of high-velocity im-
pact of less than 0.1 has a direct payoff in redaced
heating times and therefore deserves consideration.
Some of the above considerations and recommendations have been noted
before and are not claimed to be exclusively the result of this program.
The unique contributions of this effort, relative to the above, are believed
to be in (1) quantifying the various trade-offs involved;(2) provie.-ing
the quantitative basis for selection among various possible implementation
approaches, to complement judgment factors which will iievitably be in-
volved in the c'aoice process; and, (3) providing a framework for justifying
a chosen course of action in a manner consistent with quarantine program
requirements.
57
iit
r
i
i
i
Appendix A
PerLinenL Mathematical considerations
Presented herein are the various justification--, mathe-
maLical . nd otlicnai.se, used in the developi:iert of thn generalized
planetary quarantine implementation model discussed in the main body
of this report. The individual deviations are itemized in the
following; presc-iitation and they are sequenced according to the order
in which they are refe.-enced in the main text.
Ttem 1:	 P(N) 5 m(r) p(g)
whore P(N) = probability Lliat a given Lander mission
contaminates the planet in question
pi(r) = average number of viable organisms released
onto the planet from the lander
p(g) = probability* that a viable organism, randomly
released by-the lander onto the planet, grows
and spreads during the quarantine period
As indicated in the main text, P(Pi) is, by definition,
expressible in the form
P (N) - P { N  Z^ 1)
where N  denotes the (random) number of micro-organisms of terrestrial
origin which are deposited by the lander onto the planets surface or
into its atmosphere and subsequently germinate and spread during the
period of quarantine. Therefore, in terms of the (random) number, NR,
of viable organisms of terrestrial origin which rare released by the
i
*For convenience, the symbol P`(.)
	
is used to denote the probability
ghat the event (.) enclosed wi.t,iin the bracket occurs.
-_	
_-
bonder onto theplanet's surface rjr into its atmosphere, P(N) may be
wri`ten in the form
P(N) = 1 P 1140 '21, NP = v}
V=o
P 1Nt 	 > / NP = . } P f," = ,^
v=o
The quantity PING ? 1 / i^x = v} in the right-hand side of the preceding
expression denotes the conditional probability that NG	1, given that
Nh=v.
Assuming v viable organisms are released onto the planet and
randomly indexing these organisms, the following (characteristic)
quantities are defined:
1	 if the ith organisms grows and spreads
X.i
0	 otherwise
i = 1, 2,. . ., v
In terms of the Xs, the precedin;; conditional probabilities may bei
expressed
	
p - rNN >- 1 INx = J = P 1 X. = 1 for some i = 1, 2,	 vi
= 1 - P 1X.3. = 0 for all i. = 1, 2,	 )
i.e., given that v organisms are released, the probability of con-
tamination is equal to one minus the probability that none of the
organisms grow and spread during, the period of quarantine.
At one "c•xtrewe" it can be assumed that Clio X i are
statistically i dependent, i.c., Clio growth and spreading of any one
orf;anism i.s unrclatcd to 1-he observed behavior of the rem.-ii.ning
organisms. In Chis instance the X i are independent Bernoulli variables
and, for v = 0,
P -)(X i =- 0 for a1.1 i == 1., ^, 	 v} - Ll	 p(g) Jv.
Furthermore,
Combining Clio preceding expressions it is seen that
CO
P (N)	 `•' p ( g) P;NR	v^
j(	
v=0
li
5 p ( g) m(r)
Therefore, if m(r) i
	
R
s no greater than /p(g), then P(N) is no greater
than R and Item 1 applies.
Although the preceding development was based, in part, on
the ass. nption that- the X.s were statistically independent, other
i
extremes yield the simc result. For example, one may assume that, for
any given landing, either all or none of the released organisms grow
and spread during the quarantine period. In this instance,
PlX i = 0 for all i = 1, 2,	 v^ =1 -p(g)
zinc] therefore,
Cu
P (N )	 p(g) PIN,; ^ v)
v= 0
v
CID
=0
p ( g) m(r)
w
.a .
Item 2:	 mk (r)	 III k (l) Ik(r)
where mk (r) == Mean number of viable organisms released
from the ]Ah source class
inl (1) = Mean number of viable organisms which
c
arrive at the planet in the kth source
location
pk (r) = Probability that a randomly selectc-1
viable organism which arrives at the
planet in the kth source location is
released
Let 1\1 k (a)= the (random) number of viable or g anisms %,hick
arrive at the planet in the kth source location .
Nk (r) = the (random) number of viable organisms which are
released onto the planet from the kth source location.
The mean number released can be expressed in the form
v=0
_	 v	 P lr2 k (r) ---`/Izk(a) = v i } P N^k (a) _	 l^
V-0	 )I=O
1
L L v P'lk (a) = 
v1l 
-_) Plr^k(a)
N (r) = v/N	 = vl^
v1=0 v=0  
The quantity enclosed within the square brackets in the preceding
[	 expression is equal to the conditional mean number of organisms released,
given that V  organisms arrive, i.e.,
Mk (0)= Average loading at the lath source class
at the beginning of the time interval
of interest
Aiuk (v) = Average increase in loading at the ktl-
source during the with subinterval of
t in►e
pk (s v) = Probability that a rindonly selected
ori;: iiism, which is located at the kth
source location and which is viable at
the beginning of the with subinterval of
time, survives throughout the with subinterval.
The (random) number., Nk (-), of viable organises in the lath source
class at the end of the with subinterval of tine is ex pressible in the
form
(	 hk(v) = IN,	 4-3	 A iik(v) - I\N -(v)
where
L is+( ) _ (random) number of organisms added to
the source clr_ss during the %th subinterval
bNk ( •j) _ (random) number of organism , in the
l;th source class which do not survive
the subinterval
Taking averages of both sides of this expression produces
where
r(v) = average number of viable orgarisms
'l
	
	located in the kth source class at the
end of the with subinterval
l^
1
vl
V l' JI 1Z
O)
	
/Iai`(;t) = 
vl ^ = n^l:(r/Nk(a)	 ^1)
V=0
	 n-
or
°1k(r) 	 V (r/I', (a) __ vl ) Piivk (a) = vl^
As in the case of ltcn:J, al ,ovc, ore might assume the
statistical independence of thr release: of the viable organisms t.71)ich
at the pl niet u ithin any one source category, ) f co, then
mk ( r / 1\1 k ( r, )	 J) = vlpk(17)
where pk (r) denotes the probability that a randomly selected viable
orL.inism which arrives is released onto the planet. Combining the
previous two expressions produces the desired representation, i.e.,
r
mk (r) = mk(1) 1'k (r) .
^i	
Here again, the assumption of sLatistical ii..'ependcnce was
used but was not absolutely necessary. Fcr example, if one ass-.mes
that either all or none of the arrivin- organisms will be relerrcd
(i.e., total correlation) then the pr(• cedin- e::pression results.
n 
	
n 
Item 3:	 mk (l) = :nk (0)^ /l pk(s.L)`Ank(I) \/F/2pl`(sv) +	 .
+ Ain k(nk-I)Pk(r.k) a Gmk(nd
where
rr	 = Average number of viable organisms
arrivin, at the planet in the loth
source location
I
n'i'	 = average number of viable organisms located
in the kth sotirce class at the end of the
with subinterval t:hich were there at the
Ibc£Inni.nF of the subinterval
1L is conservatively assumed tbaL ally organism added to tl ►e source
class during the sul nteival survives at l.cast to the end of the sub-
interval. Morcovcr, reasoning, simil.ar Lo that used in the precc0t);^
items produces
mks:(")
	
'ilk ('d - 1 ) 1'k(sv)
i.e.,
III k(v) :: III (`) - 1) 1 )k(; v)+ A mk(v)
Combining expressions of Lbe previous form for all values of v = 1,2,...nk
results in the desired expression since
Ill k (I)	 m1c(n1c)
= mk (nk - 1)pk ( s11 )+Gmk(11k)
k
= mk(nk 2)pk(sII-])1'k(s
11k 	n
)-FAmk ( v -1)l, k (snk )4-Amk (n k ) etc.
CO
Item 4:	 Pk(r) _ f Pk ( VI) gk(VI) ^Pk(rl/\'I)
0
+ ^1-1)1.(rI/VI) 1 q( ti / c
 ) Pk ( r,/V I )} dvI
where
ilk (r)= Probabili.Ly that a randomly selected
organism, located aL the kth (buried)
1
	
source class and viable at the instant
of impact, t.il.l be released onto the
planet during the period of quarantine
_ 1	 a
?' _ ' ^ -	 - _ -	 F ^ •_sue-	 , jam- -	
-
	
1) L,
	
= Impact velocity distribi.tion function
associated with the LLh (hurled) source
class
gk (V 1 ) r Conditional probability that: a randoml
selected organism from the loth (buried)
source class survives impact, given
impact velocity V1
q k(s/c ) = Conditional. probability that a randomly
selected organism from the kt t. source
class and wliich survives impact survives
erosion mechanism at a particular rate
of erosion
i)l;(rI/V	 Conditional probability that a randomly
selected organism from the kth source
class, which survives impact, is released
as a result of impact, given impact velocity VI
pk (re /V	 = Conditional probability that it randomly
selected organism, from the kth source
class, which survives impact, is sub-
sequently released as a result of erosion,
given impact velocity V I and given that iL
is not released as a result of impact and
survives erosion
The overall. release probability associated with the ktb
buried source class is expressible in the form
i
Pk (r) - f P r r/V ) P (\T-1VI
0
where pk(r/V 1 ) denotes the conditional prcbabili.ty that a randomly
selected organism from the kth source class is released, given impact
	
velocity V 1 . In turn, 1) (r /V
	
can be written
pk(r/V 1 )	
Pk (VI)9k(V1)
whereg k ([' 1) and pk(VI) are as previously defir_cd. It is a^surted
that release is possible in .,nly two muttially exclusive ways, viz,
e	
through the fnrce of impact cn the planet and tliroul;h the post-impact
erosion of the source matcrlal. Hence, p k (r/V I) is expressible by
'	 pk(r/v ) _ pl.(rI/[; l) t q*(rc/['1)
where pk (V I ) is defined previously and where gh(r e /V I ) denotes
the conditional probability that a randomly selected organism from
the loth source class is released through erosion, given impact velocity
VI and survival of impact. Finally, for convenience q }:(re AT	 is
further expressed by
gk(re /1' I) = {].-pk(rl/V1)}qk ( s / e ) Pk(re/['1)
^	 where pk (re /V I ) is analogous to g lc (r" /V1) with the additional condition
1: at th(: randomly selected organism was not released through impact
with (-lie planet. Appropriately comb fining, the preceding expressions
tiien produces the desired relationship. In derivinn this relationship
we °e the follotaing sequence of events: (1) an organism survives
imps 112) is not release in the process of impact; and,(3) survives
t' - erosion mech^-nisei at a particul r rate of erosion	 and is released
1`_• H-t! mechanis-.. of erosion during the quarantine period.
?,fKud
	 ['1 ? Vkc
0	 othen-iise
where
X = Exposure depth coefficient
f k (V 1) = Fract::re ratio associated the kth source
material and the impact velocit.y V 
Prior studies and experiments demonstrate that the
probability that a randomly selected organism buried or ttwbedded within
a solid material. will be exposed upon fracture of the material is
approximately cqual Lo the effective Proportion of the solid's interior
which is exposed through fracturing. ?,fk (V j ) corresponds to this
proportion with f
11
(V I ) deno? ipg the ratio of the effective area
exposed upon impact to the total volume of source material. X is an
assumed constant associated with the effective depth below the newly
exposed area to which exi.s"ing organisms will be exposed.
1
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Appendix B
Computer 1`lodol
Tlic program described herein is the result of several mcInUis
0f modification with respect to both the progrminminl; method used and
the model definition. In this section, however, only the program
which was used will. be described.
Basically, one. program has been exercised. This program was
written in the 11114 basic pro ramming language for a time shared system
and accessed from an ASR 33 teletype terminal. There wure, however,
a few rims that -t•/c:re made using a slight modification of the program.
A description of the program as it was used normally will. be
 given,
and available options of the program will be discussed. The discussion
is followed by the flow chart and program listing. The input to the
program consists of a data matrix, 0. It is convenient to think of
this matrix in terms of three sub-matrices. Given that there are n
source classes to be considered, the first n rows of Q correspond to
the n source classes, and thus constitute the first sub-matrix. The
next suh-matrix has many ro.as*to allo y for different Lander impact
velocities. For each of the.:. impact velocities there are four
possible values for the fracture ratio coefficient: of which the first
is defined as unity for mated and interior source classes. The third
sub-matrix consists of one row of probabilities such that each column
in the rOW corresponds to the same rotir in the second sub-malri.x and
is the probability of impacting at the specified velocity.
In the first sub-matrix, the information contained in each
row, corresponding to each source class, consists of i_n:ti.al microbial
loading, the ratio of f/a cycle time to terminal. sterilization time,
the effective D-value during the f/a cycle, the effective D-value
during the terminal sterilization, MAST option sterilization time-,
probability of arrival at the planet, three parameters to indicate
lthat the source is surface, nutted, or buried contamination. For
buried sources allowance is made for two erosion parameters, the
erosion rate for buried contamination, or the amount of recontamination
t
lid
after the f/a cycle for nonhuried sources, and two tlu+rmal. profile
parameters. To sepnrate each of the sub-matrices a value of 999 eras
entered in the last row and column of c, ch sub-matrix. OLhenaise the
last column of enrh sub-illa r rix contained a zero.
After t1w data is read into the program from a scri.es of
data statements, the user may enter "STOP" or "NO CHANCE IN DATA", and
"TSPRWILE" or "NO PKOFILE". If the user enters anything else, the
prol;ram will ask for the row and col.uam of the Q matrix where. a
change is desired, and it will as], for the nee3 value desired. Modifi-
cation to individual data values will continue to be accepted in this
way until the user inputs 999, X, X where X is an arbitary number.
Next, the program computes a matrix W. 14 represents the probabilities
of mi.crobal release when the spacecraft impacts on the planet's
surface. Each row of UT represents a different impact velocity dis-
tribuLi.on, while in each row, column elements are grouped according
to each possible fracture ratio, each group containing elements for
each of the possible critical Vel-ocities.
The program next begins a loop that increments the terminal
sterilization variable, T3, initial3y in increments of one hour. 	 For
each value of the variable T3, Llie program loops on each source class
using the inCormati.on in the Q matrix which was mentioned previously
to form the transition probabilities for each of the source classes.
Of course, only the source classes which are buried would be subjected
to an erosion cycle after impact. The program will, at this point,
compute the adjusted sterilization time and f/a cycle time. Vie
^t	 resulting product- of transition probabilities for each source class is
'	 multiplied by the initial loading to give the mean number of mi.crobcs
f	
released onto the planet for that particular source class and placed
I	 i.n the appropriate column of the first row of the matrix R. The
source class number is placed in the same column of the second row of R.
The contributionn from each source class are summed to give
the total contribution for that particular sterilization time T3. If
this total. contamination is less than a certain acceptable amount (10
-3 ) ,
V
f.
the sterilization time loop is executed again to give precision to within
1/10 of an hour. After accuracy to within 1/10 of: an hour has been ob-
tained, the program exits from the sterilization time loop. This ends
the first phase of the program.
The remainder of the program is concerned with the preparatio,. of
results for output and the print-out itself. Initially an input allows
the operator to call for options of listing data and/or tracing each
source's progression in addition to requesting the number of sources to
be ordered and displayed.
This section consists of a contamination release vector reordering
procedure, a printout of the KO most dominant sources, and the 'trace'/
'list' option. After exit from the sterilization time loop a matrix R
of dimension 2 x I (1), which contains each source class' 	 released
contamination in the first row entry and in the corresponding second row
entry the source class number, as it appeared in the input matrix Q, is
presented to the reordering section. While the matrix R contains final
released contamination, the vector V contains the contamination released
only through erosion. However, only R is to be ordered as this ordering
is done column-wise with the KO most dominant source, appearing at the
first and their corresponding source number in the second row and, thus,
the information contained in the V vector corresponding to source class
I may be retrieved by printing V(R(2,I)).
In the printout each of the KO most dominant sources are displayed
on a single line. Column-wise under respective headings, the source num-
ber, original bio-loading, contamination released through erosion, and
total released contamination are printed.
Next the required terminal sterilization time is given to the nearest
tenth of an hour. if the 'list' option was invoked, the input data for
the KO most dominant sources is then printed. Next the programmer may
trace the various sources at each stage of the process from F/A to the
impact-erosion epoch for terminal sterilization times of 2, 4, 6, S, ...
up to the required terminal sterilization time. In case the trace
routine is opted at the second operator intervention, the data 'list' is
skipped altogether and the 'trace' is done directly.
The tracing is run by inputing the source class to be traced followed
by a comma and the 2-hour interval at which the tracing begins. When no
further tracing is desired 0,0 is entered to terminate the 'trace' procedure.
f
In terms of the computer variables, the model will now be
formulated as it appears in the program. Table B-1 relates the computer
parameters to those used in Appendix A.
First the probability that a particular viable organism of a
particular source class will survive until impact with the planet is given
by:
T = P1 [1G	 D1 C10	
T^ + (1 - 6k) Q(k,il)
k,10 l
	+ (1 - 60
	 Q(k, 1)
The probability of an organism being released upon impact
given that it survived until pre-impact and survived impact is given
by:
C	
E 'kfk(VI)
	
Pk(VI) /T = T	 VI>Vc
The erosion factor is given by:
	
U = Q (k , 9 ) + Q 
(k,10)	 Pk(VI) + E k I k(V ) p (VV )IV- c	 VI>Vc
Thus, the mean number of microbes contaminating the planet during a
quarantine period of T6 years is given by:
M (r) = (T - T') [(F.1 U T 6) 6k+ T'] Q(k,l)
where:
	
1	 k = 2
6k =
	
0	 k=0,1
i	 U-
yVariable Program	 Designation
modelparameter)
mk (0) Q(k,l)	 all sources
k	 =	 1,2,3Q(k,ll)Qmk (2)
t k3 T3
tk2 Q(k,2),	 T1
Dk3 D1
Dk2 D2
((s
	 ^
Is	 '
fPk (VI 2 VKc ) I W (1, k)
^b
k-non - buried
Pk(Vl) Q(7,1)
Xfk (V I )for K =1,2,3,4 at 0 impact Q(5, L+1) = 0
1000 Q(6, L+1)
fk ( 0 ) 0	 all non -buried
Q(k,9)
	
buried
t (1)f 0 non - buried
k Q(k,10) buried
i
ek Q(4,11)
i
tq T6
TABL	 B-1
i
In the above equations, k denotes the particular source class.
The remaining variables are defined as follows:
T1 = ratio of F/A cycle time to terminal sterilization time
T3 = Terminal sterilization time
D1 = Dk3
D2 = Dk2
P1 = probability that the lander craft arrives at the planet
Pk (V I ) = Probability of impact velocity VI
Q(k,l) = initial mean loading corresponding to source class k
r
Q(k,9) = 0 for all non-buried sources fk 0) otherwise
n -	 Q(k,10) = Alk
	 k
(3) For all non-buried source f (1) otherwise
Q(k,ll) _	 ,ik (2) For all non-buried source E1 otherwise
E1 = erosion rate for all buried contamination
T6 = length of quarantine period (yrs)
Q(5,1) = f k (V I ) for K = 1,2,3,4 at an impact of 0 ft/sec
0(6.1) = fk (V I ) for K = 1,2,3,4 at an impact of 1000 ft./sec
Note from the above that the computer model assumes a total
of 4 source classes and two possible impact velocities at 0 and 1000
ft./sec. It is also assumed that there is 1 critical velocity and
that it lies between 0 and 1000 ft./sec.
f
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FLa,T CHART (CO\T'D.)
COMPUTER PROGRAM
14' PE,, )	 LORD DATA FROM 1 TH"ZU I ( 1 ) SOUf:CFS, I ( 1 )+ 1 THRL I I	 I TICAL.
14? P c:i,...VFLOCITIF_. '.1ITH J(?)-2 -- 1FSF FCTIVF. Frtf+CTI T RE r ATICIS,J(?)+l TH :l'•
1 43 REM...I(3) DIFFE::FNT P(V) CLG?VES !11711 J(2)-J(1) E(JTr.IE:.•
145 RFt?t.•.THF "99(>" SIGiNALS THE END OF A DATA FLOCK.
149 DIN F(15,50
150 DI?; L(2,50),-,(50,12),it(?,50) PV( 50)P'.!(10,30)
151 DIil 1%C15,5r1),8(15,50),C(15,50)pDC15,50)
15? DFF FNA(X)=X
153 DFF F NP, ( X)=X
154 D F F FNCCX)=:.
155 L1 ,L2=0
1 80 Y=1
190 K=0
200 I ,.1= 1
210 J(1)=12
2?0 J(?>=6
?30 J(3) =4
240 ='E6D O(I,J)
250 J=J+ 1
260 IF J=J(!<+ l ) THEN 280
270 GC TO 240
2FO READ 0(I,J)
290 IF C(I,J)=999 THEN 330
300 I=I+1
310 J=1
320 GO TO ?40
330 K=K+1
3.140 I (',<)=I
350 IF K=3 THEN 390
360 I=I+1
370 J=1
30 GO TO 240
3F5 :EM-
386 REil. • . I :iS Rl-'C T I0VS F--F! viODF. OF RUN'NU:G P ;IG A'vi.
387 P l •, . .
3 c;9 PE?; • . .
390 FCR P6=1 TO 50
392 V(P6)=O
394 P:EX T  P6
400 Ii•:pfi f Xs
402 11=1_141
40S IF XS _' STOP ' THE!: ?330
410 I F X°=' ; • '0 C11A 1GF I X DATA
	
T 11FN 455
4 ?0 Ii"PUT <4,Y:,,/A
4 30 IF Xz—?= '9 T (F_2. 455
435 IF X4<=I (1) TF1F:\ 440
4 37 L2=L?T1
4:,0 O(X4,Y4)=1_4
45n C7 T7 L22,3
4;,5 IF Ll =l THEN: 462
-1160  I F L2=0 TFIEi: 6:10
46? FO;? 1=1  TO 10
46 4 FC? J=l T ,: 30
i: , F, 	 '• w (T ..t) =n
1l:
4 6 UFXT J
470 P!FXT I
490 S(I)=500
505 LO= 1F-C:
510 T6=17
514 HFN...
515 RE ...001 • PIJTF. idATRIX OF SUMMATIONS CF P(V)'S AND F*P(V)'S•
516 PE;•1...
5?0 ;9(1,1>=1
530 FOR J=I(?)+1 TO I(3)
540 FOR L=I(1)+l TC I(2)
550 FOR K=1 TO 1
5 66 FOR I=1 TO 4
570 IF 0(L,1)<S(K) THF'N 610
5 S ':CJ-I(?),(I-1)*5+K+1)= A( J-I(2),(I-1)*5+E:+1)+G(L,I+1):*:0(J,L-I(1))
590 MFXT I
600 F:FXT K
610 NEXT L
620 NEXT J
6?1 REM...
622 RE'1;...CYCLF ON STERILIZATION TIi•E UNTIL 1•(R) <RF:0(11REMP'.!T•
6?3 RF_M...
630 T2=30
640 Z,TO=I
650 FOR T3=T0 TO T2 STEP Z
651 X0=0
652 EIO,nl,B2,B3,RA,R5,B6pB7,BS,P9=0
654 IF T3<? THEN 660
656 IF Z=.1 TtiFN 660
657 IF (T3/2)-INT(T3/?)<>0 THFN 660
6 5f; X0=1
6(,0 S=0
670 FCR I8=1 TO I(l)
680 D1=INT(0(IR,u)/100)/10
690 T1=INT(C(Iq,0-)/100)
700 Tz=(r(IF',4)-1000AD1)/10
710 P1=0(IFt,5)
720 D2=(C(I^„2)-Tl'10^')/10
7?? T5=Ii'T(0( ;,3)/100)
7?3 D3=(0(I6,3)-T5ll0(')/10
7;30 J=IVT(CCI8,6)/'l)+1
740 IF 0<I3s6)-Ii!T( (I$,6)/3)':3=0 T:-{Ei •d F00
750 IF 0<I+;,h)- I.\TC^<i0,6) /3)'3=l iHE=i`J 700
760 Cc C(Ifis7)+5'^C%(I^isR)-'?) +6
770 GO TO F10
780 OS=((IF,'#7)+l
790 GO T':j 810
800 Or=1
S10 E1= (!`: : ' l 1)
61? C=1
813 T=O(IP.,I)
F'l/i IF	 THENN' SIS
816 C=O
P1 R IF I'1 =i1 THWIM 9.10
AP
r
L
is
E
C
7,-	 mopor	 .w
	
-a-
~ 920 T=T:l (-T1/C?)V
83 !2 I F X0 0 TW-N' c.' ?6
824 F(T3/2, H) ='I
F !6 P3=C*FP,!C(0(I8,9))
F?F; T=T+n3
830 IF T5=0 THFX F,60
832 T=T*10r(-T5*T3/D3)
834 IF T> 1 w-74 THEN 637
837 IF XO=0 THEN 850
839 A(T3 /?,I8)=T
S50 P0=C*P,.'P%(0(IS, 1 1) )
855 T=T+CO
860 IF T4<>O THEN 880
862 IF D l =0 THE;! F;6Y
865 T=1•*IOr(-1*3/D1)
868 IF XO=0 THFN 895
870 Ei(T3/2,I ;)=T
875 GO TO 895
880 T=T* 10 r ( -T-',/r) 1 )
8S5 R(T3/2,IF)=T
895 P1=ClFi,!.3(0(Ifi,10))
900 T=T+91
905 T-T*Pl
910 S1=T
920 T=T*tl(J,Of,)
930 S:?=T
932 IF XO=O THFN 940
935 C(T3/2,I,o))=T
940 IF O(Iry ,6)<>2 THFN 1050
950 IF 2(IF,6)=0 THEN 1050
960 U=C(IE;,9)+G(I..,10)=;'i(J,0(Io,7)+l)+'1(J,08)/LO
970 IF 'El'l : U*T6 —1 THEN' 1010
980 V(IS)=F1' = U T6*C JI-J/)
990 T=(51-5?).;:E1,:ti^T6+^,?
1 000	 Tr; 1050
1010 T=S1
1020 V(IR)=S1-S?
1030 G` . TO 1050
105 S=S+T*Y
1053 IF XO=O THEN 10A0
1055 D(T3/?,IS)=V(IF,)
1060 r;(1,I8)=T
1070  R(?, I,') =I'
10P0 i l!FXT I ',
1090 IF S<lOr(-3) THFN 11?0
1100 NEXT T3
1 110 GO TO 1170
1120 IF Z=.1 THEM 1170
1130 T2=73
1140 TO=T3-1
1 150 Z=•1
1 160 GO Tj) 650
1 161 REi•i...
1 162 RFi4... I i•!STRUCT I ^NS FCR DATA P::I `T AND NUi•iRF?, OF SOLIPCFS T L, P E.
e
1 163
4MMMMM§6^
REM.. - C-PU QED AND PRI NTFi) .
1 164 REM — - -
1 1 70 INPUT
	 Y_ ,1<O
1171 RE',,...
1172_ F? EM. .•. P E-CRDER CONTAMINATION RF:LEASF	 VECTOi	 RY DF(;REASING.
1 173 REii...MAGNIT11DE.
1	 1714 REMt .. .
1190 K=0
1200 FOR	 I=1	 TO	 I(1)
1210 FOR	 J=I+1	 TO	 I(1)
1220 IF	 R(i,J)<=R(I,I) lHFN	 IPSO
1 230 I<=K+ 1
1?40 L(I,1<)=R(l,J)
1250 LC 2.,1<)=R(?,J)
' 1260 RC 1,	 l) =10
1 270 IF	 K=KO	 THEN'	 1 350
1280 NEXT J
? 290 1<=i<+ 1'
I30OL(I,K)= R(1,I)
1 310 1_(2;V)	 I >
1 32 PC1,I)=01
1330 IF	 K=',<0	 THEN	 1360
1340 NEXT	 I
1350 R(1,I)=0
1360 FOR K= 1	 TO KO- l
1 370 FOR	 J=;<+1	 T)	 KO
1 3?0 I F	 LC I ,K) >=L( 1 ,J) TL1FN	 1 450
r 1390 L=L(I,K)
! 14nn M,=L(?,K)1 410 L( 1 ,1<)=L( 1 ,J)
14?0C 1430 LC?,!<)=LC? ,J)L(1,J)=L' 1440 L(?,J)=M
1450 NEXT J
1460 NEXT K
?470 FOR	 J=1	 TO	 I(1)
14F,0 IF	 "'.(1,J)=0	 THEN' 1610
1490 IF	 1-(1,'(0)>=-,(1,J) THEN 1610
1 500 FOR	 1<= 1	 T 	 KO
1510 1F	 R(I,J)<=L(I,X) THEN 1540
15?0 K4=K
1530 GO T7	 1550
154n NXT K
1550 FOR K=KO TO K4 STEP -1
1560 L<1,K+1)=L<1,1C)
1570 L(%,K+1)=L(2,K)
1580 NEXT	 1<
1 590 L(1,K^,)=Z(1,J)
1 600 LC?,Ki)_'(?.,J)
1 610 NFXT J
1 620 FOR	 1=1 	 TO	 Kn
I 1630 RC1,I)=LCI,I)
1 640 R(?, I) =1_C?, I >
1650 j\	 Xf	 I
1.	 1
l
i
1660 PRINT	 i
.) PRRINT	 I I SIN r,	 16fi0
1(I ,0: SOLIRCF.	 N^,.	 H(0)	 RFR,0F)10N	 hiC1%)-T(ITAL
1 690 FOR	 I = 1	 TO	 i<0
1700 PRINT	 ?(2,I),OliII2.•I),I),V(R(2,1)1,i (1,I)
1 710 NFXT	 I
1 720 P R I NT
1730 PRINT"PEGL I IitF..D	 STFRILIZATI7N TIi-,F="T3"H3URS"
1 740 PR I NT
1745 IF	 Y.S='T^ACF'	 THE"	 185?
1 750 IF	 YS— 'LIST'	 THEN	 1570
1 760
1770
PP I NT
PP.IOJT
1 71,0 PR 1 NT"INPUT PARAM ETFRS"
1790 PRINT
1800 P12INT	 USING	 1310
1810: LOAD	 T(F/r,)	 O(FIA)	 D(TS)-TO	 P(A)	 A	 B	 C	 FO	 Fl	 E1
1 8?0 FOR
	
J= 1
	
T7	 t<0
1830 I=R(2,J)
1840 PRI^!T	 1'SI1G	 1f,50	 ,r,CI,1),C<I,?),CCI,3),C(1,4),0(I,5),:^(I,G),O(I,7),
OCI,e),^CI,9)s0(I,10),OCI,11)
1 850
..	 •	 ..
 
,r 
,n	 v ,r rr r:	 ^^ . 9	 a14V	 4'	 r, ,	 l	 1	 ;; . 1	 l
C
1
1951 N F. Y, T	 J
1852 PRINT"F)0URCF
1 853 INPUT J, F
1854 IF	 J=0	 THEN	 18E:0
1855 FOR	 I=E TO	 INT(T3)	 STEP 2
1856 PRINT"	 "I"HOUitS"
L 1857 PRINT"LOAD	 AT	 END OF P.P.-"E(I/2,J)
185P IF G(J,6)=2	 THEN	 1860
1859 PRINT"BUILD-UP	 A.FTF_R P.F •="C(J,9)I
1860 PRI-INT"LOAD AT	 FND	 OF
1861 IF	 0(.J,(,)=2	 THEN	 12,63
1F.62 PRIINT"DUIL.D-UP AFTER	 F/A="	 O(J,il)
1863 PRI :T"LOAD	 AT	 EidD	 OF	 T.S•="BCI/?,J)
1F64 IF 0(J,6)=2	 THEN 	 Ir66
1865 PRINT"RUILD-UP	 AFTER T.S="	 0(,1,10)
1066 PINT"RELEASF THRU	 IiiPACT="r,(I/?,J)
1867 PRINT" P FL.F.ASE	 THRU	 EROS-="[)(I/?,J)
1864 NEXT	 I
1869 GO TO	 1652
1 870 PP I UT
1 8F;0 PR I NT
1890 DAT'	 1F7,305,005,5On,1,1,0,0,1F6,0,0,0
1900 DATA	 177,305,005,500,1,1,1,1,IF6,G,0,0
i 1910 DATA.	 1F7,310,010,100n,1,1,1,1,l"5,0,0,0
1920 DAT A.	 17,350,050, 5000, 1,?,1,'?,10,1^,1E-6,999
2000 DATA	 0,1,0,0,0,0
1 2010 DATA	 1000,1,1	 -4,0,0,°99
2020 DATA	 .9,.1,0,999
2310 RESTC;-2E
? 3?0 GO	 TO	 180
2330 _ND
V
1
	
1
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
A (k )	 -	 Area exposed assuming no break up of the craft
A kl) (V I )	 -	 Additional area exposed as a result of the source
material breaking away from the craft
Ak (V I )	 -	 Additional area exposed as a result of fracturing of
the source material
Ak (V I )	 -	 Surface area exposed to the planets' atmosphere
Dkv	-	 Microbial resistance associated with the k-th source
class during v-th heat cycle (at 1250c)
ek	-	 Erosion rate associated with the k-th source class
fk (V I )	 -	 Fracture ratio, the area newly exposed per unit
volume of k-th source class
gk (V I )	 -	 Conditional probability that a randomly selected
organism from the k-th (buried) source class
survives impact, given impact velocity VI.
m (r)	 -	 Mean number of viable organisms released onto the planet
mk (r)	 -	 Average number of organisms released from the k-th source
mk (I)	 -	 Mean number of organisms located on the k-th source at
the instant of impact
mk (o)	 -	 Average loading of the k-th source class at the beginning
of the time interval of interest
Amk (v)	 -	 Average increase in loading of the k-th source class during
the v-th subinterval of time
n s	-	 Number of contamination sources on the lander
P (N)
	 -	 Probability that a lander will contaminate planet
P (g)	 -	 Probability that a viable organism grows and spreads during
quarantine period
Pk (r)	 -	 Probability that a randomly selected organism located in
the k-th source class at the instant of impact will be re-
leased between that instant and the termination of the
quarantine period
fjk
' Pk (SO -	 Probability that a randomly selected organism which
is	 located in the k-th source class survives the v-th
' subinterval (conditional upon previous survival)
Pk (V I ) -	 Impact velocity distribution function associated with
the k-th (buried) source class
Pk (r I /VI ) Conditional probability that a randomly selected
organism, taken from the k-th source class and which
survives impact, is released as a result of impact,
given impact velocity VI.
s
1
Pk (re /V I ) -	 Conditional probability that a randomly selected organism,
taken from the k-th source class and surviving impact,
is subsequently released as a result of erosion, given
impact velocity V I and given that it is not released as
a result of impact, and survives erosion.
i
a
q 
(s/e)
-	
Conditional probability that a randomly selected organism
from the k-th source class and which survives impact,
survives erosion mechanism at a particular rate of erosion
R -	 Prescribed maximum allowable 	 value
	
for P (N)
t q -	 Time between impact and termination of quarantine period
' tkv -	 The effective time at which heat is applied at 1250c
Vk -	 Volume of material in the k-th source class
`
V I -	 Impact velocity of lander
Vk -	 Critical impact velocity associated with the k-th source
class
-	 Effective depth of exposuref
C
.0
1
rq
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